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ABSTRACT 
Social Networking Sites (SNSs) offer a unique platform to communicate based on 
real identity. Under the authoritarian regime in China, SNSs have become a tool to share 
and communicate alternative political information. This study seeks to identify the 
framing differences between SNSs and mainstream media by comparing the framing of 
two recent cases, the Li Gang incident as domestic news and the Diaoyu Island dispute as 
international news. The largest SNS based on real identity in China was selected to 
represent SNS websites, and People’s Daily online was selected as the representative of 
mainstream media. Results show that frames used on Renren and People’s Daily Online 
were different at large. Renren was overall more critical towards officials, and extremely 
positive in reporting powerless victims. Furthermore, Renren tended to present a one-
sided story and questioned censorship and credibility of the mainstream media in China 
openly. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
In the western world, especially the United States, the media are generally 
regarded as free. Their role is to serve democracy. However, many studies have 
suggested that mainstream media, public or private, are often apparatuses not of 
democracy, but of hegemony (Harcup, 2003; Gitlin, 1980; McChesney, 1999). Herman, 
Chomsky and Lewis (1997) criticized the mainstream media and their conservativeness 
and the control of media by the big conglomerates in the video: The liberal bias. Indeed, 
research into news organizations and routines has well-documented that the news product 
tends to privilege mainstream positions and serves the elites, rather than promote a 
―marketplace of ideas‖ (Gurevitch & Blumler, 1990, p. 33). 
The disappointment towards mainstream media‘s hierarchical information flow 
and the eventual popularization of the Internet in 1990s shifted the focus to online 
democracy and prompted hope that the new computer-mediated communication could 
promote democracy (Tai, 2006).  Unlike traditional media, which are characterized by 
―unidimensional, centralized, pyramidal and hierarchical‖ communications (Tai, 2006, p. 
177), the Internet brings in a multidimensional environment and also fosters 
decentralization, pluralism and democracy (Hanson, & Narula, 1990). Furthermore, 
Poster (1997) noticed that the decentralized nature of the Internet provides an alternative 
channel for the public to move away from the established political communication which 
is centered on broadcasting media to a new ―cyborg politics‖ that disrupts the traditional 
status, authority and power.  
Accordingly, Kahn and Kellner (2004) studied bloggers‘ ability in wielding 
political influence on the public decision making in the United States and argued such 
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communication has the potential to establish a ―virtually democratic‖ community. 
However, theory and practice of public opinion in the Internet era has been heavily 
grounded in the Western democratic polity where media are allegedly free and 
independent from government control.  
In authoritarian systems, the mass media are in tight control of the government 
(Siebert, Peterson, & Schramm, 1956; Hallin, & Mancini, 2004). Especially in China, the 
media are strongly censored, usually serve as mass mobilization tools to guide public 
opinions in support of Party policies, and further conduct favorable propaganda for Party 
ideology (Dai, 2000). Since every publication has to be approved by the General 
Administration of Press and Publication of the People's Republic of China (The State 
Council, 2001), which is a controlled apparatus of the government, there are literally no 
alternative publications for political content. In addition, the surviving alternative 
publications do not call for democracy and political reform and instead focus on 
environmental education and other non-political public issues (Yang & Calhoun, 2007; 
Cao, 2007).   
Therefore, the dissident voices are mostly expressed and communicated online. 
With the diffusion of Internet, and computer mediated communication technologies, 
especially the emergence of various social media such as blogs, Bulletin Boards Systems 
(BBSs), microblogging, photo sharing, Social Networking Sites (SNSs) and so on 
(Kaplan & Haenlein, 2010), more and more Chinese people now find a way to express 
their alternative political voice, and access to alternative political opinions. Tai (2006) 
cited Morgan Stanley's The China Internet Report which identified the public's flocking 
to the Internet as a sign that embodies the opening up in a culture where self-expression 
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and interaction have not been hallmarks. According to Jin (2008) and He (2007), online 
communication on the Bulletin Board Systems (BBSs) and blogs empowered the public 
to challenge the authorities of local government, and to prompt revisions of legislation, 
which exemplified huge progress for China's democratization stimulated by new media. 
This argument is confirmed by Han & Zhang‘s (2009) study of the ban of the Starbucks 
in the Forbidden City, where they found that a proposal on a weblog widely escalated 
into a public campaign, and then the case caught the attention of the mainstream media. 
Due to the decentralized structure of social media, the censorship towards social 
media is not as effective as towards print, audio, or video publications. Although the 
power of the social media still needs time to be explored, the recent uprisings in Egypt 
and the Middle East, where social media, especially Facebook, Twitter and YouTube, 
functioned as a platform to organize, coordinate and support their uprising with words, 
pictures, and videos taken by mobile devices (Cafferty, 2011), are perfect examples of 
how social media can be critical in enabling political movement. The Chinese 
government instantly realized the transforming political potential of social media and 
how a single spark can start a prairie fire as Chairman Mao cited to describe the 
unstoppable trend of revolution in 1930s, and shortly censored the keyword ―Egypt 
uprising‖ in the search results in the hope that the country‘s citizens will not get any big 
ideas of what‘s going on in other nations (Moore, 2011; Kan, 2011).   
As many scholars observed, the Internet can potentially democratize a society 
(Becker & Slaton, 2000; Locke, 1999). This trend has been reinforced again by the surge 
of SNSs, where netizens can communicate political information as well as other 
information based on their real identity.   
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Therefore, it is significant to ask what characteristics SNSs have in political 
communication and how they are different from mainstream media in China. As Abbott 
and Yarbrough (1999) have concluded, the way people learn things is dependent on the 
structure of the communication system in a society. Under an authoritarian regime with 
strong censorship, SNSs can perform as a platform to circulate alternative information or 
news by comparing framing of two recent cases: the Diaoyu Island dispute and the Li 
Gang incident between the largest SNS in China, Renren.com, and People’s Daily Online, 
sponsored by People’s Daily, China‘s largest newspaper and the organ of the Central 
Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (Zhou & Moy, 2007). Furthermore, the 
study examined censorship and credibility of the mainstream media, and analyzed the 
factors that influence times being shared and read on Renren.  
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
Media and Democracy 
Were it left to me to decide whether we should have a Government without 
Newspapers, or Newspapers without a Government, I should not hesitate a 
moment to prefer the latter. 
Thomas Jefferson, 1787  
In modern democracies, the media are expected to facilitate democracy through 
providing pluralistic information necessary for the public to make choices and participate 
in public debates (Manning, 2001). The extent to which the less powerful and politically 
marginal can obtain media access is one of the most significant debates concerning 
democratic processes. 
Democracy is literally impossible without media (Sparks, 1998) for basically two 
reasons. First, media perform essential political, social, economic, and cultural functions 
in modern democracies and foster deliberation, diversity, and ensure accountability in the 
society.  Media ensure the public has access to information essential to the health of 
democracy so that they will make ―responsible and informed choices rather than acting 
out of ignorance or misinformation.  Secondly, the information provided by the media 
serves as a ‗checking function‘ by ensuring that the elected representatives uphold their 
oaths of office and carry out the wishes of the voters‖ (Center for Democracy and 
Governance, 1999). 
 Ideally, the media should promote a marketplace of ideas. However, the media in 
an open society, such as United States, cannot always achieve this end. Early in 1990s, 
Chomsky argued the U.S. media serve the elite interests instead of the ―ignorant masses 
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(Chomsky, 1992, p 369).‖  This statement is precisely accurate in authoritarian China 
where media serve as the mouthpiece of the government since the establishment of 
People‘s Republic of China in 1949. 
Media System in China 
A significant moment in the development of communication theory occurred 
when four theories of the press were proposed by Siebert, Peterson and Schramm in 1956. 
Concerning the relation between press and society (McQuail, 2010), they categorized the 
media in four kinds: ―authoritarian‖, ―libertarian‖, ―social responsibility‖ and ―Soviet-
communist‖ theory. An important aspect of the whole project was the proposition that the 
‗press always takes on the form and coloration of the social and political structures within 
which it operates. Especially, it reflects the system of social control‘ (Siebert, Peterson, & 
Schramm, 1956). Later, Blumber and Gurevitch (1995) proposed four dimensions of 
media for comparative analysis: (1) degree of state control over mass media organization; 
(2) degree of mass media partisanship; (3) degree of media-political elite integration; and 
(4) the nature of the legitimating creed of media institutions.  A similar measurement was 
proposed by Hallin and Mancini (2004). In all the measurements, state intervention in the 
media is clearly a critical shaping force of media systems. 
Based on the four theories of the press, China roughly falls under a mix of the 
authoritarian system where the presence of strong state control over media is prevalent 
and the communist model where the government owns most of the media in the country.  
In the media sector, as Chu (1994) described, the Chinese Communist Party functions as 
the "owner, manager, and the practitioner.‖ Although the four theories of the press fail to 
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capture ―transition‖ models and the media are changing constantly instead of being static, 
the four measurements can still reflect the media system at large.  
In China, the news media are owned by the central government or the state, are 
required to follow Communist party and government policies, and act as "the bridge 
between the party and the people" (Yin & Payne, 2004, p. 373). The government 
regulates the news media through the General Administration of Press and Publication of 
the People's Republic of China. The agency has the right to issue or revoke news media 
licenses (CCEC.GOV, N.D.), establish press regulations and laws, and appoint or remove 
chief editors (Chu, 2010). 
After the Reform and Opening-up in the late 1970s, the Chinese media have 
transformed dramatically. The core of the media is still state-controlled, but the 
government stopped subsidizing the media and the market is gradually exerting its 
influences on the development and modernization of the media industry (Zhao, 1998). 
Circulation and advertisements are the main revenues for the media, and the content is 
largely decided by the play of the state and the market. Needless to say, the market is 
subordinate to the state since the state has the power to regulate media‘s performance and 
even revoke its license. The party ―sets the politically sensitive agenda [for] the media to 
guide public opinion,‖ while ―the money takes charge of the non-politically sensitive 
domain‖ (Chen & He, 1998). 
The failure of the mainstream media to present a holistic view of the society turns 
people to alternative media to participate in online political debate about domestic as well 
as international news and events. Scholars constantly examine the influences of online 
communication and predict that the online communication could transform the rigid 
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authoritarian system to a more democratic one (even in a democratic society, online 
communication may have the same impact).                    
Online Blogs, SNSs, and BBSs as Alternative Media 
 There is a relatively small body of research on the content or political effects of 
alternative media (Atton, 2002; Downing, 2003; Fuchs, 2010; Harcup, 2003; Platon & 
Deuze, 2003), which makes generalizations on political outcomes quite difficult. At the 
present time, the definition of alternative media is still murky and scholars are still 
grappling with what alternative media are. Atton (2002, 2003), Downing (2001), and 
Fuchs (2010) have made significant headway in this field, but the concept is still broad 
and open to discussion. 
Synthesizing works of alternative media and thus creating a clearer point of 
distinction, Tsfati and Peri (2006, p. 170) wrote, ―In sum, mainstream media are the 
largest economic (public or private) corporations aiming to reach the widest possible 
audience and representing the central national value system and Weltanschauung 
(‗worldview‘). Nonmainstream media are simply all other news organizations that are 
available to the audience in a given society (which differ from mainstream media to 
varying extents).‖ For the purposes of this study, alternative media are subsumed as any 
components of nonmainstream media as defined above. 
The first attempt to tackle alternative media is made by Armstrong (1981), who 
sees the underground press, a participatory medium, as antecedent of alternative media to 
address sensitive social problems that were neglected in the mainstream media at the time.  
Since these early studies, Downing (2001) and other scholars have incorporated theories 
of power and hegemony into the alternative media construct, expanded alternative 
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media‘s function as not only a voice for social movement, but also a form of resistance to 
hegemonic structure in society. The resistance can be carried out as social movement, and 
oftentimes, it is a form of expression that triggers diverse alternative media production 
(Atkinson, 2010).   
Rauch (2007) concluded the previous scholars‘ efforts in studying alternative 
media and defined alternative media in four dimensions, and they are: the content provide 
(devotion to oppositional issues, events and opinions not regularly advocated elsewhere), 
the channel through which content is provided (such as photocopied flyers, pod-casts or 
hand-made buttons), the sources featured in that content (including unofficial, poor, 
minority and dissident voices), or the modes and values they espouse (citizen 
participation, direct action, collective decision-making, etc.) (Haas, 2004; Hamilton, 2000; 
Örnebring and Jönsson, 2004).  
Applying the definition of alternative media in China, it is easy to figure out that 
there are literally no true alternative publications that exist publicly since all the media 
must be approved by the General Administration of Press and Publication of the People's 
Republic of China, and all the publications that are permitted should in one way or 
another serve the interests of the government. There‘s also no statistical information 
about underground publication. Therefore, the alternative media in China can only be 
found on the Internet, especially after the booming of Blogs, Social Network Sites and 
the Bulletin Board Systems.  
In the new media era, Sayre et al. (2010) demonstrated such a phenomenon in 
which user-created YouTube videos actually influenced the agenda of mainstream media 
on a given issue. Thus, when Bennett and his colleagues wrote that alternative media 
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reach ―few opinion makers or average citizens‖ (2004, p. 451), there is historical and 
contemporary evidence that its influence can indeed be observed.  
The Development of Internet and Social Media in China 
 Surpassing the U.S., China has the largest number of Internet users in the world 
since 2008 (Liang, & Lu, 2010). The newest China Internet Network Information Center 
(CNNIC, 2010) released statistical report on the Internet development shows that the 
population of Internet users has increased to 0.42 billion in 2010 at an annual growth of 
31.8%.  
 The rapid growth of the Internet is a double-edged to the Chinese government. On 
the one hand, the growth brings about numerous economic gains with the flourishing of 
Business-to-Business (B2B) and Business-to-Consumer (B2C), and also such social 
facilitation as the development of e-government and Business-to-Government (B2G). On 
the other hand, the Internet, which enables a decentralized style of communication, also 
poses significant potential challenges to censorship because of the breadth of online 
content, whose sources are often remote from Chinese jurisdiction and the rapidity with 
which sources of content can be moved (Zittrain & Edelman, 2003).  As the New York 
Times columnist Nicholas Kristof (2005) concluded: ―it‘s the Chinese leadership itself 
that is digging the Communist Party‘s grave, by giving the Chinese people broadband.‖  
 Social media, such as photo sharing, social bookmarking, video sharing, blogs, 
Bulletin Board Systems and social networking sites, enable creation and circulation of 
content, especially politically sensitive content, and also wide public discussion over such 
issues. Social media, besides serving their own purpose, become media and tools for 
political change in China, but not the cause for the change (Pan, 2006). 
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Drezner (2005) pointed out that in open societies, the Internet serves as an 
enhancer of the power of the civil society, while in authoritarian societies, the fear of the 
Internet‘s ability to redirect ―information cascades‖ will force governments to have 
strong control over the Internet. However, in the meantime, the governments ―deny 
themselves the opportunity to exploit the vast economic potential of the information 
society.‖ (p. 2) Facing the potential threats, the Chinese government decided to take a 
strong position and has issued several regulations to control the Internet and censor the 
information that is critical to the development of a ―harmonious society.‖ 
Nevertheless, the development of Internet has offered many critical advantages in 
facilitating a democratization of information flow through two-way communications and 
has allowed the public to participate in political deliberations (Song, 2007). In the book 
The Internet in China: Cyberspace and Civil Society, Tai (2006) discovered four main 
changes that the Internet brought, which are a relatively free platform, a steady and core 
cohort of opinion leaders swaying public opinions, the learning and interaction among 
Net pals, and a ―barometer for the politicians, government functionaries and lawmakers 
to gauge public opinions‖ (p. 42). For example, in 2005, Premier Wen Jiabao promised 
that the government officials should look into the worthy questions and suggestions 
posted by Chinese users online (Tai, 2006). 
The Internet users adopt the self-designated name ―netizens‖, a term that implies 
that they exert citizen basic rights, such as freedom of speech and political participation, 
online (Zhou & Moy, 2007).  Netizens often see themselves as responsible citizens who 
shoulder the responsibility to help the disadvantaged, to redress the government‘s 
negligence, and so on.  Netizens show great interest in events that did not receive proper 
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attention in the media due to journalists' narrow judgment of newsworthiness or 
censorship or any other possible reasons, and discuss them intensively online with a 
different perspective or frame.  
The Development of SNSs  
Social Networking Sites (SNSs) first emerged in the United States, where 
information communication technologies are most advanced and the buzz of Web 2.0 
was first emerged, and soon SNSs diffused to other parts of the world (Jin, 2008). The 
success of SNSs in the United States gained intense attention from Chinese entrepreneurs, 
and soon after the booming of SNSs in the United States, Chinese networking sites like 
Xiaonei or 51.com mushroomed mostly among college students. Jin (2008) noted that 
SNSs were not as popular as the traditional online Bulletin Board Systems (BBSs), which 
is an online forum where users can upload and download software and data, read news 
and bulletins, respond to specific stories, and exchange messages with other users. 
However, recent surveys and other studies found that Renren (originally Xiaonei) has 
already become the most visited site among college students (CNNIC, 2009).  
The most successful SNS in China first became popular among college students 
with the name Xiaonei, which means "on campus." Later on, as Xiaonei became more 
and more influential, in 2009, it enlarged its group of users to everyone and changed the 
name to Renren, which means "everyone."   
As of February 2011, Renren has 160 million registered users (life.renren.com, 
2011) among the 420 million Internet users in China. Since Renren was initially aimed at 
college students, its users are mostly of ages 19 to 26 (CNNIC, 2009), that is to say, most 
of the users belong to the group most closely watched after the Tiananmen Square 
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protests, which were mostly carried out and mobilized by young college students. The 
government knows too well that college students have the potential to contest its 
authority and destabilize the authoritarian regime. Therefore, in 2005, the Ministry of 
Education required all College Bulletin Board Systems sites to serve as an exclusive, on-
campus communication platform based on real-name registration. The implication of this 
reform is that the connection with the outside alumni and other citizens was cut off, and 
the users could not venture to explicitly express themselves for fear of being tracked 
down. However, the emergence of SNSs saved the Chinese college students from the 
isolation of the college Bulletin Board Systems. At the very beginning, much like 
Facebook, only college students could register on Xiaonei.com and offered them a 
broader platform to express themselves and communicate with peers. Now, with its 
changed name, Renren, Xiaonei broadened its users to the whole population in China. 
Nevertheless, the proliferation of online media has drawn a lot of attention to its 
potential to support and contest the mainstream media. Several scholarly studies looked 
into the uses and gratification of Blogs, the political significance of Blogs and Bulletin 
Board Systems. However, most researches on Chinese SNSs focused on uses and 
gratifications, such as self-presentation or disclosure (Jia, Zhao, &Lin, 2010; Chu, & 
Choi, 2010), cross comparison between different SNSs (Zhang, 2010) and market-driven 
topics, such as the use of SNSs for promotion of products (Shao, & Gao, 2010), and 
barely on political issues. 
Blogs and Bulletin Board Systems (BBSs) 
Early research on blogs debated much about whether blogs, a kind of 
participatory media, are ultimately a force for democratization (MacKinnon, 2007). 
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However, apart from bringing new forms of online civic discourses online, blogs‘ role in 
political changes still depend on how people choose to use them and also to what extent 
the Chinese government succeeds in controlling the use of blogs for political dissidence 
(MacKinnon, 2007). 
Research conducted by He (2007) on blogs found that blogs are mainly a medium 
to fulfill the gratification of self-expression for Chinese blog authors, not dedicated to the 
supply of useful information, let alone serving as news resources. For the authors, blogs 
fulfill this desire by having their personal memoirs published, offering personal 
gratification, publicity and perhaps a sense of assurance that these private thoughts matter. 
For readers, blogs serve as a means to contact one‘s friends and family members, to gain 
information and knowledge, and even to sustain the delusion that in reading blogs, they 
free themselves from China‘s censorship regime. Furthermore, Chinese blog readers 
expect more from blogs than merely fulfilling a voyeuristic gratification. However, most 
blog authors failed to supply their readers with sufficient and useful information. 
According to Tang (2009), Chinese bloggers use the platform to publish sensitive 
sexual content and satire of politicians, and exercise their freedom of speech in the 
blogosphere. In addition, though exaggeration and excess, blogs question the normal and 
the official and have become a popular culture (Ma, 2000, p.28). In this way, bloggers 
participate in the political process (Klinenberg and Benzecry, 2005, p.11), and thus form 
―a public sphere to negotiate with political domination, gently pushing the state to allow 
more social spaces to flourish‖ (Tang, 2009, p.10). 
Furthermore, He (2007) looked into the audiences‘ perception of the freedom of 
blogs and discovered that the blogs are deemed as the freest medium and thus viewed as a 
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medium alternative to the rigid and censored mainstream media. The researcher also 
found that audiences take blogs as ―a serious source of information,‖ partly because they 
think the information on the blogs is not censored as much as the mainstream media and 
do not realize that the blog writers are self-censoring the information in order to publish it 
online. He did not dig more into the question why the audience believe in blogs 
regardless of the obvious lack of reliability and offered as a possible reason the 
decreasing credibility of the mainstream media.   
While blog users can write anonymously online, the ―free-for-all structure of the 
BBS makes it possible for people wanting to speak freely online to hide in the large 
crowd of fake user-names and cloak their anonymity more successfully (MacKinnon, 
2007, p. 36).‖ Although it is expected that the companies or academic institutions hosting 
BBS should monitor and censor dissident political information, the sheer volume of 
postings makes it impossible to censor all the dissident information. Software detecting 
sensitive words is developed and used widely on BBS, however, BBS users can easily get 
around by using pinyin, or mix symbols, in between sensitive words. Successfully posted 
politically sensitive information and opinion can exist for hours and sometimes even days 
before being discovered and taken down (MacKinnon, 2007). For this reason, users such 
as political activists or frustrated journalists in China have generally turned to BBS 
websites as the place to post newspaper stories and even photographs that are too 
politically sensitive to get past editors. ―The BBS are also the place where politically-
minded people of all professions have tended to go for political debates and discussions 
(MacKinnon, 2007, p. 36).‖ 
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Furthermore, Agichtein et al. (2008) conducted an analysis on Yahoo! Answers 
and found that the website is usually accurate in predicting high-quality items close to 
that of humans. On SNSs, it is hard to say whether there are some techniques to identify 
the potential popular posts, however, the maneuvers in predicting and promoting 
popularity can only influence the availability of the information, one of the many reasons 
people share and read. There are other elements that decide whether a person shares or 
reads the post, such as interests, relevance, trend, etc. And it is meaningful to ask what 
kind of information suits the mass tastes and tends to be shared and read widely.  
Fortunately, Renren happens to count times being shared and read to show the 
popularity of the story. Times being shared is counted by counting the number of times 
people actually click the option ―share this with my friends.‖ However, as long as you 
opened the story, Renren would count one time as being read. Therefore, the times stories 
being shared and read on Renren is positively correlated. If a story is shared by more 
people, more people had the chance to read or view it from their friends. The increasing 
probability of reaching out to more people would naturally lead to increased readership. 
Therefore, the number of times being shared is always lower than the number of times 
being read. This can be accounted to the fact that people will first read text or watch 
video before they decide to share the story. Hence, the first research questions of this 
thesis set out to explore the following: 
Research Question 1: What variables predict Renren story‘s popularity? Are 
superficiality, type of media and use of emotion-laden words correlated with high shares 
and high reads? 
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Framing Differences 
 During the first decade of the Internet‘s prominence from the early 1990s, most 
online content resembled traditional published material and the majority of Internet users 
were consumers of content created by a relatively small amount of publishers. Entering 
early 2000s, there was a transformation in the type of content online, and user-generated 
content has become increasingly popular on the Internet (Agichtein et al., 2008).   
With more and more users participating in content creation, user-generated 
content domains mushroomed in many formats such as blogs, web forums, social 
bookmarking sites, photo and video sharing communities, as well as social networking 
platforms such as Facebook and MySpace, which offers a combination of all of these 
with an ―emphasis on the relationships among the users of the community‖ (Agichtein et 
al., 2008, p. 1). 
Content on social media is different from the traditional content on websites in 
―style, quality, authorship, and explicit support for social graphs (Bian, Liu, Agichtein, & 
Zha, 2008).‖ The distribution of quality of content in social media has high variance: 
from very high-quality items to low-quality, sometimes abusive content (Agichtein et al., 
2008). However, the rich structure of social media presents inherent advantages over 
traditional media websites.  
A similar study was conducted by Song (2007), who found a clear difference in 
covering a hit-and-run by the US military in Korea between online content and 
mainstream conservative media‘s reports. Further, he concluded that the composition of 
news sources, and the frames used to make sense of the issues were disparate. Online 
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news content was progressive and also played an important role in escalating reactions to 
the deaths of the two schoolgirls into a broader anti-US sentiment. 
The user-centered blogs, BBS, and SNSs make it easy and possible for users 
themselves to create online news or cite from some mainstream media or other sources, 
and furthermore (Argenti, & Barnes, 2009), there are less surveillance and direct 
censorship in creating and disseminating news from the users‘ end. Therefore, it is to be 
expected that the framing of online news from blogs, BBS, and SNSs is different from 
the online mainstream media.   
As noted previously, before SNSs emerged in China, people mostly 
communicated online anonymously or using fake names, and constantly had concerns 
about censorship (Jin, 2008). Although SNSs are also censored by the government, they 
allow users to see that most people around them have the same concerns (MacKinnon, 
2010) and the law does not punish numerous offenders as the Chinese proverb says. 
Therefore, in this unique platform, people seem to grow bolder, and critical information 
is actively circulating around. In addition, there might be a discrepancy between the 
public‘s frames of an issue and the official frames. 
Framing Theory 
The concept of framing was first introduced to social science by Goffman and 
Bateson in 1974 and has become a widely adopted theoretic approach in communication 
field as scholars sought to determine how news is presented or ―framed‖ and what exactly 
are the effects of framing practices (McQuail, 2010). 
As Schramm (1949) defined, news is ―an attempt to reconstruct the essential 
framework‖ of an event or issue (p. 288), which can be viewed from a variety of 
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perspectives, and this is also the major premise that framing theory is based on (Chong & 
Druckman, 2007). Framing is essentially the communication of this construction (Adam, 
2010) and in the process of building frames many factors can influence the structural 
qualities of news frames (De Vreese, 2005). Internal to journalism, unconscious personal 
ideologies, self-censorship, organizational structures and so on determine how the frame 
is made (Shoemaker & Reese, 1996). External to journalism, continuous interaction 
between journalists and elites (Gans, 1979; Tuchman, 1978) and social movements 
(Cooper, 2002; Snow& Benford, 1992) also influence the frame-building. Scheufele 
(1999) concluded five factors that potentially influence how journalists frame a given 
issue: (a) social norms and values, (b) organizational pressures and constraints, (c) 
pressures of interest groups, (d) journalistic routines, and (e) ideological or political 
orientations of journalists. At last, ―the outcomes of the frame-building process are the 
frames manifest in the text‖ (De Vreese, 2005). 
Across time, the definition of framing constantly developed. Frames are defined 
as ‗persistent patterns of cognition, interpretation, and presentation, of selection, 
emphasis and exclusion by which symbol-handlers routinely organize discourse by Gitlin 
(1980, p.7)‘, and as ‗interpretative packages‘ that give meaning to an issue by Gamson 
and Modigliani (1989). At the center of the ―interpretative package‖ is ‗central 
organizing idea, or frame, for making sense of relevant events, suggesting what is at issue‘ 
(Gamson & Modigliani, 1989:3, italics in original). Building on the existed literature, 
Entman (1993) put forward the most widely adopted definition of framing and saw 
framing as essentially involves ―selection and salience‖ and to frame is to ―select some 
aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in 
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such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, casual interpretation, moral 
evaluation, and/ or treatment recommendation for the item described‖ (p.52). 
 Framing, unlike agenda-setting which deals with salience of issue, deals with 
what the media cover and how much coverage they afford, deals with perceptions 
(Dimitrova & Stromback, 2005), and how the media cover the issue and suggest how to 
think about it (McCombs & Ghanem, 2001, p. 69).  Many scholars tried to identify what 
constitutes a frame in a news story. Entman (1993, p.52) suggested that not only the 
presence of ―certain keywords, stock phrases, stereotyped images, sources of information 
and sentences that provide thematically reinforcing clusters of facts or judgments‖ can be 
examined as frames, but also the absence of such elements can be viewed as frames. A 
similar argument of journalists construing frames is proposed by Shah et al. (2002, p. 367) 
by noting that journalists‘ ―choice about language, quotations, and relevant information 
lead to emphasis upon certain features of a news story and, in turn, significantly structure 
citizens‘ responses to public events and issues by encouraging certain ‗train of thought‘‖.  
Frames are identified by Gamson and Modigliani (1989) as devices that condense 
information and offer a ―media package‖ of an issue.  Framing devices oftentimes refer to 
metaphors, exemplars, catchphrases, depictions and visual images (Gamson & 
Modigliani, 1989, p.3). According to De Vreese (2005), the most comprehensive 
empirical approach is developed by Tankard (2001, p, 101) who listed 11 framing 
mechanisms or focal points for identifying and measuring news frames: headlines, 
subheads, photos, photo captions, leads, source selection, quotes selection, pull quotes, 
logos, statistics and charts, and concluding statements and paragraphs. 
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After synthesizing previous research on framing, two major types of frames were 
identified: issue-specific frames and generic frames (de Vreese, 2005).  Issue-specific 
frames refer to frames that are pertinent only to specific topics or events, while generic 
frames refer to frames that can ―transcend thematic limitations and can be identified in 
relation to different topics, some even over time and in different cultural contexts‖ (de 
Vreese, 2005, p. 54). This line of research was developed by Semetko and Valkenburg 
(2000) who quoted Neuman‘s definition of news frames as ―conceptual tools which 
media and individuals rely on to convey, interpret and evaluate information‖ (p. 94) and 
viewed previous studies and summarized five generic frames, which will be explored in 
this thesis: the responsibility frame, the human interest frame, the conflict frame, the 
economy consequences frame, and the morality frame.  
The responsibility frame ―presents an issue or problem in such a way as to 
attribute responsibility for its cause or solution to either the government or to an 
individual or group‖; the conflict frame ―emphasizes conflict between individuals, groups, 
or institutions as a means of capturing audience interest‖; the human interest frame 
―brings a human face or an emotional angle to the presentation of an event, issue, or 
problem‖; the economic consequences frame ―reports an event, problem, or issue in terms 
of the consequences it will have economically on an individual group, institution, region, 
or country‖; and the morality frame ―puts the event, problem, or issue in the context of 
religious tenets or moral prescriptions‖ (Semetko, & Valkenburg, 2000, p. 95-96). 
Disparity between Rich and Poor 
 While the world marvels at the pace of China‘s economic growth, the Chinese 
government‘s emphasis on profit rather than overall progress toward a more open and 
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democratic society has contributed to many financial and social problems such as 
worsening inequality and rampant government official corruption (Cheng, 2006).  
The most commonly used measure of inequality is the Gini coefficient (Sloman, 
2000), which reflects complete equality at ―0‖ and complete inequality at ―1‖ (World 
Bank, N.D.). In 2009, the Gini coefficient reached 0.47 in China, surpassing the 
recognized warning level of 0.4, which is a critical threshold that could lead to social 
unrest (GOV.cn, 2011; China Daily, 2010). 
Since the nature of the distribution of goods and service in China follows 
socialism ideology, which boasts equality in the distribution of wealth and a peoples‘ 
government (Marx, & Engels, 1848), the reality that wealth is concentrated in the hands 
of an exceptionally small group and government‘s corruption and abuse of power pose a 
sharp and ironic comparison with the ideological guidelines and further push the social 
conflict to the verge of breaking off.     
In order to promote a ―harmonious society‖ and ―social stability,‖ Chinese official 
media try to downplay such issues touching the privileges of government and the rich; 
however, netizens are very sensitive to such cases (Cheng, 2006). Cheng (2006) 
examined the newsworthiness of hot topics on BBS and found that following nationalism 
articles, the second hottest topic is the sharp class resentment and the widening gap 
between rich and poor, which is one of the most important topics triggering widespread 
effects on BBS.  
  One case he identified is a hit-and-run accident, where a Lincoln car, a symbol of 
luxury, hit and dragged a little girl for almost 3,000 meters to her death. The incident was 
largely viewed as a typical case of the rich and powerful trampling on the underprivileged. 
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A similar incident happened on May 7, 2009, when a University student was run over by 
a rich second generation official racing with his friends (Sohu.com, 2009). The sole lack 
of responsibility for others and themselves and lack of respect for people‘s life are 
enough to trigger uproar online; the symbol of rich can easily lead to the discussion of the 
privileges enjoyed by the rich and powerful, and the social inequality that most netizens 
experience in life. Therefore, this study focuses on two incidents that bring this inequality 
to light. 
Public Uproar in the Li Gang incident 
 On September 16, 2010, a car accident happened on the campus of Heibei 
University. After hitting two girls who were crossing the street, the driver did not stop to 
check the condition of the two victims but moved on to the campus dormitory to pick up 
his girlfriend. In his way out of the campus, he was intercepted by students and security 
forces, and the first thing the driver said was, ―My father is Li Gang‖.  
 The incident rapidly caught the attention of Chinese netizens, and they soon did 
―human flesh search‖ (everybody contributed information to hunt down the searched 
individual), and found the driver‘s name was Yifan Li and his father was the deputy 
director of the Public Security Bureau.  Due to the power of Li‘s father, most of the 
witnesses refused to give interviews, and officials at Heibei University also indicated that 
students should not participate in activities that might cause trouble for themselves.  
 However, the platform of Internet provided an alternative way to express the 
witnesses‘ anger towards Li and the power play of Li‘s father. Their posts criticizing Li 
were widely spread, and netizens around the country have used the derogatory sentence 
―My father is Li Gang‖ to justify unethical and abnormal behaviors (for instance, ―I 
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killed a cat. Oh, well, my father is Li Gang‖). In the meantime, sentences using the 
phrase ―My father is Li Gang‖ were shared by a great number of netizens. The reasons 
behind the strong condemnation from netizens are basically the hatred towards drunk 
driving, and the arrogance, corruption and misconduct of the second generation of 
officials.  
 Later on, the incident evolved into several scandals including the censorship of 
University and local government, the plagiarism of the president of the University 
involved, Li Gang‘s multiple mansions in rich districts, and so on. Personal information 
of Li Gang‘s son, including his Renren page, working place, and personal life, was 
revealed online.  
 Online media paid intense attention to the development of the incident. These 
activities prompted the governor of Heibei province to publicly promise that he would 
deal with the case with justice and equity. The recent light sentence of three years in 
prison for Li once again incited uproar among netizens; in the meantime, the netizens 
also feel helpless in changing the current situation. 
The Diaoyu Island Dispute 
The Diaoyu Island dispute between China and Japan has lasted for more than a 
century, and each country tries to establish claim or title over a disputed piece of territory 
by referring to historical references (discovery), continuous occupation, and effective 
authority (government) (Chung, 2004, p. 28).  
The Diaoyu Island in Chinese or Senkaku in Japanese is part of a tiny group of 
islands, 6.3 square km in total, in the East China Sea. The islands consists of eight tiny 
insular formations, of which only two are over 1 km (the Diaoyu Island is the biggest one 
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with 4.3 square km), five are completely barren, and none are currently inhabited or have 
had any kind of reported human economic activity. 
The seemingly insignificant rocks are of strategic importance in terms of security 
and economy, as well as their political implications since the Diaoyu Island is located 
approximately midway between the island of Taiwan and the Japanese Ryukyu Islands, 
which makes it special to both China and Japan's national defense. The securement of 
Diaoyu Island to either party will prolong and enlarge its frontier, and put the other party 
into a disadvantaged position.  
The dispute emerged in the early 1970s following a promising prediction of 
hydrocarbon deposits in the seabed around the island. After the discovery of reserves of 
natural resources, Japan put boundary markers in Japanese around the island and 
removed the Chinese boundary markers. Later, in 1972, the United States returned 
"administrative rights" over the island to Japan following the Okinawa reversion, but 
refused to take a stance on the sovereignty disputes partly due to the protests among the 
Chinese people in North America.  
Following the first incident that triggered the long-lasting dispute, the break of 
Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty (PFT) signed in 1978 by Japan put the 
Diaoyu Island dispute under the spotlight again in 1979. Then in 1990, "the Japanese 
Maritime Safety Agency (MSA) decided to recognize the lighthouse constructed by the 
Seinensha in 1978 by including it in the official navigational charts and allowing 
members of the right-wing group to renovate the lighthouse, which they promptly did". 
The forth incident happened in 1996 when members of the largest right-wing Japanese 
nationalist group, the Nihon Seinensha, built a 5-meter-high solar-powered aluminum 
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lighthouse on one of the smaller disputed islands named Kita Kojima to facilitate the 
declaration of its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Not long after the lighthouse was 
built, the right-wing group set up the national flag of Japan and a wooden board in 
memoriam of the deaths in wars.  
The recurring dispute over Diaoyu Island is hard to negotiate, and each party tries 
to establish its legitimacy over it. The Chinese government provided ―a mountain of 
historical evidence to indicate the Diaoyu Island in the East China Sea has been Chinese 
territory since ancient times.‖ (People’s Daily Online, 2004) They perceive the cession of 
Diaoyu Island as a result of defeat in the Sino-Japanese war in 1895, and according to the 
Cairo Declaration, it should be reversed to China at the end of the World War II (Chung, 
2007). The Japanese government, argues the Diaoyu Island was discovered by Japanese 
around 1880s, months before the treaty was signed, and claims the island as territory of 
Japan. After the World War II, the United States took over the Diaoyu Island and 
reversed it to Japan in 1972. But it is of question whether the island was actually China‘s 
territory instead of ―terra nullius.‖ 
Nationalism and Chinese Media 
When the Diaoyu dispute recurs, the timing, method, and intensity of the claims 
by each side are dictated not only by ―respective positions on the sovereignty question, 
but more importantly, by domestic factors not fully within the control of the government‖ 
(Chung, 2007, p.53). The domestic factors refer to the rise of nationalism or irredentism 
and an increasingly confident military in China.  
It is extremely easy to trigger Chinese people‘s nationalism and hostility towards 
Japan because the bitter memories from World War II still linger on. To some extent, the 
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Chinese government argues the taking over the Diaoyu Island and nearby resources 
represents a ―continuing attempt by Japan to keep what it had stolen from Chinese people 
(Chung, 2007, p. 53).  
Nationalism, however, has been evaluated as negative since it increases the 
chances of international conflict (Downs & Saunders, 1988/89). Three broad themes of 
nationalism have been identified in the academic studies. First, nationalism can divert 
attention from state‘s inability to meet ―societal demands for security, economic 
development, and effective political institutions.‖ (Downs & Saunders, 1988/89) 
Oftentimes, the government blames foreigners for failures of their own and increases 
international tensions. Second, nationalism serves as a legitimate explanation and search 
for support by states that have expansionist or militarist goals. Third, competing parties 
can utilize nationalism to mobilize public support or threaten competitors, thus to gain 
advantage in domestic political competition.   
Nationalism is paramount in the Chinese government‘s agenda. The mainstream 
media, which follow the government‘s stance, often use harsh words condemning the 
―fault‖ of foreign countries. Li (2009) cited Schell‘s conclusions about the general 
characteristics of nationals, who are sensitive to the issues regarding Chinese collective 
identity, national insecurity, loss of face, insult and humiliation as foreign arrogance, 
bullying, lecturing, sense of superiority, and condescension. Due to the past unpleasant 
history between China and Japan, new dispute between China and Japan would remind 
Chinese people the past tragic memories and the nationalism can be easily triggered off. 
Moreover, as Cheng (2006) identified nationalism as the top triggering topic that could 
generate wide online debate, the recent Diaoyu Island dispute was no exception. 
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The recent Diaoyu Island disputes originated from a collision of two Japanese 
naval vessels and a Chinese boat when Japanese vessels tried to intercept the boat on 
September 7, 2010, around the disputed Diaoyu Island (Johnson, 2010). After the 
collision, Japanese boarded the boat from China and did inspections on the boat (Johnson, 
2010). The next day, the boat's captain was taken for questioning for intrusion of 
territorial waters of Japan and arrested for the crime of interfering with public affairs.  
According to the Chinese official response to the Diaoyu Island incident, the 
Chinese boat was in China‘s territorial waters, and Japan‘s illegal arrest of the Chinese 
captain was a clear signal to China that the Japanese already see themselves as the 
owners of the disputed area. Just like before, whenever tension between China and Japan 
grows, a series of discussion of wrongdoings of Japan will dominate the online public 
sphericules, which . The incident escalated to a national uproar within few days, and the 
heated discussion of the incident and related issue with Japan showed up on SNSs, blogs, 
BBS, and other online platform.  
Later, in Xi‘an, a large Chinese city, a protest towards Japan took place with 
many cars made in Japan destroyed. Then, a national boycott of Japanese products was 
advocated online, and several Japanese brands were listed, and people were advised not 
to buy the product from the brands on the list. In order to curb the development of the 
situation, Chinese government made the word: 钓鱼岛 (Diaoyu Island in English), a 
sensitive word that cannot be publicly searched and published.  
When it comes to issues that are highly relevant to nationalist emotions, it is not 
convenient for the official mainstream media to call for the support of the public 
explicitly; rather, the online sphericules are perfect to mobilize mass opinions. Anderson 
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(2005) observed that nationalistic diatribes and rants against Japan are generally allowed 
by the government to rage unchecked as long as they do not lead to offline protest 
activity which might spin out of control. Since People’s Daily stands for governmental 
stance and should put itself in the light of fairness and objectivity, and Renren.com stands 
for personal stance and should be more liberal in expressing feelings as to Diaoyu Island 
dispute, it is expected that: 
Hypothesis 1: Renren.com will be more critical of authority/official figures than 
Peopledaily.com in both cases. 
Hypothesis 2: Renren.com will mention censorship more than Peopledaily.com in 
both cases. 
Hypothesis 3: Renren.com will mention media credibility more than 
Peopledaily.com in both cases. 
Hypothesis 4: Renren.com will hold more perpetrators and officials accountable 
and will mention their ability solve the issue and find solutions more than 
Peopledaily.com in each case. 
Hypothesis 5: Renren.com will use more human interest frames and more 
emotive words and visual information than Peopledaily.com in each case. 
Hypothesis 6: Renren.com will focus more on conflict and will present a more 
one-sided story than Peopledaily.com in each case.  
Hypothesis 7: Renren.com will mention more wrongdoings of perpetrators and 
other parties involved in each case than Peopledaily.com in each case. 
Moreover, the following research questions is formulated: 
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Research Question 2: What is the dominant theme used on Renren.com and 
Peopledaily.com respectively for each case? 
Sources  
Journalists rely on sources for information (Williams, 1993), perspectives and 
balance; therefore, sources are integral to news construction (Adam, 2010). Sigal (1987) 
views that news is ―not what journalists think but what their sources say‖ (p.29), and 
Gans (1979) argues that ―news is information that is transmitted from sources to 
audiences, with journalists summarizing, refining, and altering what becomes available to 
them from sources‖ (p.80). Similarly Callaghan & Schnell (2011) argues that journalists 
may ―serve as a conduit for the public communiqués of others‖ (P. 186), disseminate 
sources‘ chosen frames and offering an ―acoustical boost for politicians‘ messages‖ 
(Baker, 1998). Similarly, Entman (2004) argued that news is composed of the ―selective, 
framed communications‖ of political actors (p.12). Another definition of news is 
proposed by Bennett (2009)  who sees news as ―what newsmakers promote as timely, 
important, or interesting, from which news organizations select, narrate, and package for 
delivery to people who consume it‖ (p. 19). Therefore, news is sources‘ portrayals of 
reality mediated by news organizations but journalists‘ ―construction of reality‖ (Sigal, 
1987, p. 27). To simply put, the news is therefore framed by sources (Molotoch & Lester, 
1974).  
News‘ reliance on sources is more prominent in the time of crisis, where 
uncertainty is ubiquitous, and news sources have the ability to determine how an event is 
represented to an entire society (Mason, 2007). In his research of the Australian coverage 
of the Fuji coups in 1987 and 2000, Mason (2007) found that the reporting of the incident 
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heavily relied on sources from the main institutions in society, particularly government 
sources and questioned the news reporting as a way to maintain status quo rather than 
reflecting a reforming reality. This finding is in line with most academic researches and 
predictions that the sources often cited are representatives of major institutions: 
government officials, corporate spokespersons, academics, experts and authorities on 
particular events or subjects, i.e., elite sources rather than the ―ignorant mass‖ as Herman 
and Chomsky (1994) put it (McChesney, 2002; Herman & Chomsky, 1994). In the 
meantime, the reliance on elite sources inevitably leads to an acceptance and promotion 
of ―language, agenda and perspective of the political establishment‖ (Eldridge, 1993, p. 
326).   
Believing that the media‘s values and professional practices determine how news 
is sourced, Atton (2005) sees there‘s a difference of sourcing routine between mainstream 
media and alternative media, and made the first attempt to examine how alternative 
media (SchNEWS to be specific) select, represent and deploy their news sources. The 
finding supports his hypothesis that alternative media do give ‗ordinary people‘ 
privileged media access by favoring counter-elite sources just like the mainstream media 
sourcing elites (Atton, 2005). However, alternative media tend to over access or over 
represent the anti-elite sources, and thus contradict the journalistic routine of objectivity 
(Atton, 2005). As such, the last hypothesis predicts the following: 
Hypothesis 8: Renren.com will cite more non-official sources (like victims and 
their families, lawyer(s) of the victims, witnesses, scholars) than Peopledaily.com. 
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CHAPTER 3: METHOD 
This thesis aims to determine the framing of the Li Gang incident and the Diaoyu 
Island dispute in the shared content on SNSs and mainstream media, and to examine the 
similarities and differences between the frames adopted by each. The Chinese SNS 
Renren.com was selected for its popularity and increasing influence on college students. 
According to its own website (Life.renren.com, 2011), Renren has already reached a user 
population of 160 million, the majority of whom are college students (Oak Pacific 
Interactive, 2009), who are politically sensitive and active. As the 17th most visited site 
in China, it is the largest SNS that is based on real identity, which distinguishes it from 
the QQ alumni SNS that has the largest number of users (Roven, 2011).  
 Furthermore, the widely used Renren.com functions as an alternative platform for 
communication of sensitive issues (Jin, 2008).  Because Renren is a relatively new 
communication tool, a comparison with more traditional online news website will reveal 
some of its peculiar characteristics as well as similarities to China‘s largest newspaper. 
Peopledaily.com was selected as the representative of the traditional media for its 
authority as the mainstream news outlet and its position as the leading party-line online 
newspaper in China.  
The Sample 
To gather data for this study, a content analysis of coverage of two incidents—the 
Li Gang incident and the Diaoyu Island dispute—on Renren.com and peopledaily.com 
was conducted. To determine how the two incidents are framed on Renren.com and 
peopledaily.com, the individual online news article or post (in text, video, picture or 
multimedia format) was considered the unit of analysis.  
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Since there is no direct search engine for shared content on Renren, be it video, 
picture or article, snowball sampling was conducted by closely reading shared content on 
the SNS. ―Snowball sampling is a chain-referral technique that accumulates data through 
existing social structures (Bhutta, 2011, p. 3)‖, and is common in the researches related 
with social networks. A similar study investigating the content links on Facebook 
adopted this sampling technique by taking advantage of researchers‘ friend list and 
analyzing their shared content links (Baresch, Knight, Harp,& Yaschur, 2011). In the 
study of Facebook‘s profile image conducted by Stano (2008), snowball sampling 
method was used by interviewing random users of Facebook and asking them to forward 
survey to their friend and acquaintances on Facebook to conduct the research.  
In this study, the researcher began with a small sample from her friend list of 612 
friends on Renren, and then looked into their shared content, selected out the ones that 
relates to the topics. Then, by identifying the author or the creator of the content, a further 
look at the author or creator‘s sharing center followed, and related content was selected.  
For the Li Gang incident, relevant content on Renren was identified by looking at 
content that used words such as ―Li Gang‖, ―hit-and-run incident‖, ―hit-and –run incident 
in Hebei University‖, and ―rich and powerful second generation of officials.‖ The 
snowball search produced 105 Renren posts. It is worth mentioning that during the search 
around more than ten posts were found to be censored, and only some titles and previews 
were available.  
As to the peopledaily.com, the keyword ―李刚‖ （Li Gang in English）was 
searched in the publication‘s search engine 
(http://s.goso.cn/so?k=&searchlable=0&s=content) and 394 articles were yielded in the 
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search result. Since ―李刚‖ is a very common name in China, most of the articles were 
not really about the Li Gang incident explored here. Meanwhile, People’s Daily‘s own 
search engine provided a list of categories where articles with the keywords were 
included as shown in Figure 1 where the left sidebar is the list of categories of content. 
To simplify the search process, a further search was conducted by clicking each category 
at the side of the search page, and the articles that merely mentioned the words without 
really reporting on the issue were excluded. Finally, 81 articles covering the ―Li Gang 
hit-and-run incident‖ were collected and printed out. Lastly, the time frame of the Li 
Gang hit-and-run incident is from October 16, 2010, the time when the accident 
happened, to January 9, 2011, the time when the search was conducted. 
Figure 1. Screen Capture of People’s Daily search engine. 
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For the Diaoyu Island dispute, related content on Renren was identified with the 
same snowball technique. Since the Diaoyu Island dispute is a recurring incident, 
previous reports of this issue existed. To make the dataset relevant to the recent arrest of 
a Chinese captain by the Japanese government in September 6, 2010, the search was 
limited to the time period from September 7, 2010, to January 9, 2011 (the day when the 
search was conducted). The search yielded 114 Renren posts that mentioned words such 
as ―Diaoyu Island‖, ―our territory‖, ―Japanese‖, and ―Japan.‖. As in the previous case, 13 
posts that were censored were found and added to the censored dataset and the sample is 
not exhaustive.  
The content on peopledaily.com regarding the Li Gang incident was searched by 
the author herself. However, ―Diaoyu Island‖ (钓鱼岛 in Chinese) content can not be 
searched directly from http://s.goso.cn/so?k=&searchlable=0&s=content from abroad 
(due to the Great Firewall of China, which filters content perceived by the government as 
controversial). Therefore, the search was completed by a friend who‘s studying 
journalism in Renmin University in China following the researcher‘s guidelines. By 
searching ―钓鱼岛‖ (Diaoyu Island in Chinese), 1,075 articles showed up in the results. 
Then, just as in the search technique used for the Li Gang incident on People’s Daily 
website, the researcher‘s friend looked into each category and selected and saved the 
relevant ones published between September 6, 2010, and January 9, 2011. The researcher 
double checked the content and assigned each article an ID. The final dataset has 130 
articles.  
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Conceptual and Operational Definition of Variables 
A frame is the central organizing theme in the news story. In this study, text, 
picture, video and other multimedia content will be examined for framing devices. 
Manifest variables include (2) control number, (3) date of publication, (4) title of the 
content, (5) source, (6) type of the story, and (7) time being shared (only for content from 
Renren.com).  In addition, two more general questions aim to identify the (8) dominant 
themes and the (9) superficiality of the material.  
With some differences in wording that reflect the nature of the two incidents, the 
second part of the codebook identifies the tone of the content. Tone refers to the attitude 
of the stories toward each side. The tone towards one side can be positive, negative and 
neutral (Barnes et al., 2008). A story demonstrates a positive tone toward one side if it 
expressed sympathy and indicates support for this side. A story shows a negative tone 
towards one side if it reveals critical tendency or assigns blame to this side. A story 
exhibits a neutral tone when it only plainly states the facts or when it shows no 
demonstrable attitude toward either side. For the Li Gang incident, the tone towards Li 
Gang and his son, the victims, government, the University, and spectators are examined. 
As to Diaoyu Island, the tone towards China and Chinese government and Japan and 
Japanese government are examined respectively.  
The third section of the codebook was designed to identify 4 generic frames: 
attribution of responsibility, human interest, conflict, and morality, with each measured 
by one or more questions. Frames refer to the overarching frameworks journalists use to 
structure a story. The textual frames will be ascertained by analyzing the complete article 
asking three to five specific questions for each frame. The five generic frames and most 
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of the measurements were adopted from Semetko and Valkenburg‘s (2000) study with 
slight changes to measure the two cases. 
 The responsibility frame focuses on party/individual who should be responsible for 
the issue. The human interest frame focuses on the individual story. The conflict frames 
emphasize the discrepancy between people or organizations. The morality frame focuses 
on the culture, and social norms. Issue-specific frames are measured together by the 
dominant theme, the responsible party and capable party in the responsibility frame, 
wrongdoing of some party in the morality frame and tone towards each party.   
 Furthermore, the sources that are mentioned or cited in the material were coded. 
Sources refer to persons, agencies or organizations cited in the story to provide 
background information, pertinent facts and data, and interpretation of events, and were 
coded by selecting the provided choices. Additional questions regarding censorship and 
credibility of the mainstream media were included.  
The coding instructions for the Li Gang incident and the Diaoyu Island dispute 
are outlined in the Appendix I and Appendix II respectively. 
Intercoder Reliability 
Intercoder reliability refers to ―levels of agreement among independent coders 
who code the same content using the same coding instrument‖ (Wimmer and Dominik, 
2006, p. 166). The two independent coders are both journalism graduate students from 
China since the coding content is mostly in Chinese. After two training sessions, 
intercoder reliability calculated for 10% of the dataset was computed using Cohen‘s 
kappa (Wimmer and Dominik, 2006, p. 168). For the nominal variables, coefficients 
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ranged from .77 to 1; for interval data, Pearson Correlation coefficients ranged from .85 
to 1 as shown in Table 1and Table 2. 
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CHAPTER 4: RESULTS 
Sharing and Reading on Renren 
Research question 1 was designed to investigate what variables predict post 
popularity on Renren.  Four ANOVA models were estimated with times being shared and 
read as dependent variables and type of stories, superficiality, and use of emotion-laden 
words and images as independent variables. The tests results in Table 3 revealed that 
there‘s a significant difference in the times the stories are read and shared between 
different types of post formats, and more interactive formats are more popular than plain 
format (Fshare=7.42, p<.01,df=1; Fread=20.93, p<.01, df=1). However, no significant 
difference was reported in Table 4 between times being shared or read in relation to 
whether the story was treated superficially or in-depth (Fshare=0.47, p=0.49, df=1; 
Fread=0.01, p=0.94, df=1). 
Furthermore, four t-tests were conducted with use of emotion-laden words and 
emotion stirring visual information as grouping variables and times being shared and read 
as test variables. T-tests results in Table 5 revealed that use of emotion-laden adjectives 
( tshare=2.34, p<.01; tread=2.34, p<.01) and visual images (tshare=-1.98, p<.01; tread=-2.68, 
p<.01) do make a difference in times a story being shared and read, and evidently, the 
ones that used such words (Mshare=9957, Mread=65570) or images (Mshare=8925, 
Mread=25066) were more popular than the ones that didn‘t use such words(Mshare=1277, 
Mread=5626) or visual information(Mshare=4061, Mread=72470).  
Differences in Tone 
Hypothesis 1 predicted more critical coverage of stories from Renren. On a 3-
point tone scale, where 1=positive, 2=neutral, and 3=negative, t-tests (Table 6) found that 
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in the Li Gang incident stories, the tone towards Li Gang and his son is generally similar 
and quite negative on the two platforms, with no significant differences (MRenren = 2.58; 
MDaily=2.47; t=1.43, p=0.16). On the other hand, the tone toward victims differed 
significantly between the two platforms, with People's Daily stories being more negative 
to neutral (M=1.83) and Renren's reportage tending to be more sympathetic and 
supportive of victims (M=1.71). The t-test showed that there's a significant difference 
between the tone toward victim between the two websites (t=-1.58, p<.01). 
In the Diaoyu Island stories, the tone toward Japan was generally negative (Table 
6), but it was more negative on Renren (M=2.68) than on People’s Daily (M=2.44). The 
difference in tone towards Japan is statistically significant between the two platforms 
(t=3.81, p<0.01). When it comes to tone towards China, the tone tends to be between 
neutral to negative on Renren (M=2.1) and positive to neutral on People’s Daily 
(M=1.98). The T-test indicates that there‘s a significant difference of the tones towards 
China in reporting the Diaoyu Island dispute between the two websites (t=2.26, p<.01). 
Therefore, the hypothesis is partially supported.  
Censorship and Credibility 
 The second hypothesis predicted that Renren would mention censorship more 
than People‘s Dialy online. To investigate this, descriptive analysis and crosstabs were 
conducted as shown in Table 7. In the Li Gang case, 41.9% of stories from Renren.com 
and 35.8% of stories from People’s Daily Online mentioned censorship, but the 
difference between the framing of censorship between the two is not statistically 
significant (p=0.40). Meanwhile, in the Diaoyu Case, 21.3% of stories from Renren.com 
and 0 stories from People’s Daily Online mentioned censorship, and crosstabs (X2=24.84, 
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df=1, p<.05) indicate a significant difference in reporting censorship between the two 
online media outlets. Therefore, hypothesis 2 is partially supported.  
Looking further into each case (Table 8), 77% of the censorship in Li Gang‘s 
stories mostly focused on the censorship from the University and local government, while 
90% of the censorship in the Diaoyu stories focused on censorship in the media or 
somewhere else rather than from government.  Therefore, it is questionable whether 
people are more critical of domestic news or have heavier dependency or trust in media 
or government when it comes to international news, or it is a random occurrence.   
The third hypothesis predicted that Renren would mention or question the 
credibility of media more than People’s Daily. To investigate this, descriptive analysis 
was conducted and the results are shown in Table 9. In the Li Gang case, 13.3% of stories 
from Renren.com and 9.9% of stories from People’s Daily Online mentioned censorship 
(X²=0.52, p=.47, df=1). However, in the Diaoyu Island case, none of the stories from 
both media outlets mentioned media credibility. Therefore, the third hypothesis is not 
supported.  
Dominant Theme 
To examine the dominant theme used on Renren and People’s Daily Online as 
proposed in research question 2, a frequency test and crosstabs were conducted and the 
results are shown in Table 10. In the Li Gang case, both Renren (55%) and People’s 
Daily Online (56%) heavily adopted the official power play towards the powerless mass. 
Therefore, it can be safely concluded that the dominant theme in both media outlets was 
power play between Li Gang and powerless mass. Crosstabs revealed that the difference 
between the themes used by Renren and People’s Daily Online approached significance 
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at p<0.1 level (X² =6.97, p<.1, df=3). When it comes to each specific theme, stories from 
Renren and People’s Daily were different in adopting hit-and-run as dominant theme at 
p<0.1 level (X
2
=2.77, p<.1, df=1), and also differed in focusing on censorship at p<.05 
level (X
2
=4.37, p<.05, df=1).  
In the coverage of the Diaoyu Island dispute, 75% stories on Renren adopted the 
theme of territorial dispute of the Diaoyu Island. On the other hand, only 57% stories on 
People’s Daily Online adopted the theme of territorial dispute (Table 10). Crosstabs 
revealed that stories on Renren were significantly more heavily focused on Diaoyu Island 
dispute than People’s Daily. Few stories (6%) on Renren focused on historical feud, and 
no story from Renren mentioned historical records and literature on Diaoyu Island, while 
no story on People’s Daily mentioned historical feud, but a few stories (10%) focused on 
historical records and literature proving Diaoyu Island‘s identity. Crosstabs revealed that 
stories from Renren and People’s Daily were significantly different in adopting historical 
issues (X² =8.22, p<.01, df=1) and records and literature about Diaoyu Island (X² =12.04, 
p<.01, df=1). The rest of the stories focused on other themes, and crosstabs showed that 
there was a difference between other themes used by Renren and People’s Daily Online 
(X² =8.49, p<.05, df=1).  
Framing Differences 
Hypotheses 4 to 7 were designed to explore the frames used by the two websites 
regarding the two cases. 
In the Li Gang case (Table 11), 48% of the stories on Renren and 28% of the 
stories on People’s Daily did not suggest the party who should be responsible for the 
issue in the context, while 44% of stories on Renren and 65% of stories on People’s 
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Daily indicated that Li Gang and his son should be responsible for the issue. Other parties, 
such as victims, government, witnesses, netizens, students, university, police and others, 
were only occasionally or not at all mentioned as the parties responsible.  
Furthermore, crosstabs revealed that there is a significant difference between 
stories from Renren and People’s Daily in reporting the responsible party (X²= 12.59, 
p<.05, df=5). However, most of the stories on Renren (82%) and People’s Daily (85%) 
did not really suggest the party who has the ability to solve the problem or issue in 
context. Few stories on Renren tended to suggest that Li Gang and his son (7%), police 
(3%) and other parties (6%) have the ability to solve the problem or issue in context. 
However, stories on People’s Daily mostly suggested government (6%) have the ability 
to solve the problem, followed by Li Gang (5%), students (1%), and police (1%). 
Moreover, crosstabs showed that stories on Renren and People’s Daily were significantly 
different in pointing the party able to solve the problem or issue in context (X²= 11.64, 
p<.05, df=5).  
As to solutions frame, most stories from Renren (84%) and People’s Daily (85%) 
didn‘t suggest solutions to the problem or issue in the context, and there‘s no significant 
difference between the two websites in framing solutions (X²= 0.07, p=0.80, df=1). 
Therefore, hypothesis 4 is partially supported in the Li Gang incident. 
 Most stories from Renren (91%) and People’s Daily (96%) used human 
interest/personal angles, and there is no significant difference between the two websites 
(X²= 1.80, p=0.18, df=1) according to the crosstab results shown in Table 12. Then, most 
stories on Renren (70%) employed emotional-laden adjectives and harsh words that 
generate feelings of outrage, sympathy or compassion, while fewer than half of the 
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stories (47%) from People’s Daily employed such words. Crosstabs showed a significant 
difference in the two websites‘ usage of emotional laden words (X²= 9.71, p<.01, df=1). 
Similarly, 35% stories on Renren and only 6.2% stories on People’s Daily used visual 
information that generates feelings of outrage, empathy, caring, sympathy or compassion, 
and chi-square tests (Table 12) showed that that Renren (35%) used significantly more 
visual information than  People’s Daily (6%; X²= 22.10, p<.01, df=1). Therefore, 
hypothesis 5 is partially supported; and no difference was found between Renren and 
People’s Daily in stories using the human interest frame, however, Renren did use more 
emotive words and visual information in the Li Gang incident. 
Chi-squares in Table 13 show that stories on both Renren (86%) and People’s 
Daily (86%) mentioned disagreement or conflict with no significant differences (X²= 
0.02, p=0.89, df=1). However, most stories on People’s Daily (14%) than on Renren (6%) 
presented two or more than two sides‘ opinions, and crosstabs revealed that the difference 
is not statistically significant (X²= 3.41, p=.07, df=1). Lastly, most of the stories from 
both websites did not mention winners or losers, and no significant difference was 
detected by crosstabs (X²= 1.29, p=0.72, df=1). Therefore, hypothesis 6 is partially 
supported; Renren seemed to shift more to one side, but the difference was not significant 
compared with People’s Daily in the Li Gang incident. 
As to morality frames, chi-square results are shown in Table 14. Most stories on 
Renren (61%) and People’s Daily (88%) mentioned wrongdoings of Li Gang and his son. 
Crosstabs showed that there is a difference in mentioning wrongdoing of Li Gang and his 
son between the two websites (X²= 16.38, p<.01, df=1), and People’s Daily mentioned 
more wrongdoings of Li Gang and his son than Renren. Meanwhile, stories on Renren 
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(54%) mentioned wrongdoings of other parties more than ones on People’s Daily (38%), 
and there is a significant difference in the two websites (X²=4.70, p<.05, df=1). Therefore, 
hypothesis 7 is partially supported; Renren mentions more wrongdoings of other parties, 
but less wrongdoings of Li Gang and his son than People’s Daily. 
In the Diaoyu Island case, 33% of stories on Renren and 49% of stories on 
People’s Daily did not suggest the party who should be responsible for the issue in the 
context, while 56% stories on Renren and 43% stories on People’s Daily indicated that 
Japan should be responsible for the issue (Table 15). Chi-Squares results in Table 15 
revealed that the difference is statistically significant (X²= 11.85, p<0.01, df=3). Some 
stories (6%) on Renren positioned China as the responsible party, while only 1% stories 
on People’s Daily presented China as the responsible party. Lastly, 5% of stories on 
Renren and 7% of stories on People’s Daily held that other parties should be responsible 
for the issue.  
However, 63.2% of stories on Renren and 95% of stories on People’s Daily did 
not really suggest the party who has the ability to solve the problem or issue in context 
(Table 15). A few stories on Renren tended to suggest that Japan (17%), China (19%), 
and other parties (1%) have the ability to solve the problem or issue in context. It is worth 
mentioning that Renren had more stories showing that China had the ability to solve the 
issue than stories presenting Japan in a similar way. Within the few stories mentioning 
ability to solve the problem, People’s Daily mostly suggested Japan (3%) has the ability 
to solve the problem, followed by Other (2%). None of the Daily stories suggested that 
China could solve the problem. Crosstabs showed that stories on Renren and People’s 
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Daily were significantly different in framing the ability to solve the problem or issue in 
context (X²= 45.06, p<.01, df=3).  
Lastly, significantly more stories on Renren (39%) than on People’s Daily (9%) 
suggested solutions to the problem (X²= 29.62, p<.01, df=1). Therefore, hypothesis 4 is 
supported in the Diaoyu Island dispute. 
Most stories from Renren (90%) and People’s Daily (85%) went into personal life, 
and there is no significant difference between the two websites (X²= 1.26, p=0.262, df=1) 
as displayed in Table 16. Then, most stories on Renren (57%) employed emotional laden 
adjectives and harsh words that generate feelings of outrage, sympathy or compassion, 
while fewer stories (20%) from People’s Daily employed such words. Crosstabs showed 
a significant difference in the two websites‘ usage of emotional laden words (X²= 34.08, 
p<.01, df=1). Similarly, 14% stories on Renren and no story on People’s Daily used 
visual information that generate feelings of outrage, empathy, caring, sympathy or 
compassion, and chi-square tests showed that there is a significant difference in the way 
that Renren and People’s Daily adopting such visual images (X²= 19.53, p<.01, df=1). 
Therefore, hypothesis 5 is partially supported and no difference was detected on use of 
human interest between the two websites. 
Most stories on Renren (95%) than on People’s Daily (70%) mentioned 
disagreement or conflict, and chi-square tests in Table 17 showed that there is a 
difference between the two websites in mentioning conflicts (X²= 24.71, p<.01, df=1). 
Then, 36.8% of stories on Renren and 37% on People’s Daily presented two or more than 
two sides‘ opinions, and crosstabs revealed that there is no difference in the two websites 
(X²= 0.00, p=0.99, df=1). Lastly, most of the stories from Renren and no story from 
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People’s Daily mentioned winners or losers (X²=5.82, p<.05, df=1). Therefore, 
hypothesis 6 is partially supported and no difference was found in the mentioning of two 
or more sides of the issue in the context. 
As to morality frames, 69% of stories from Renren and 49% from People’s Daily 
mentioned wrongdoings of Japan as reflected in Table 18. Crosstabs showed that there is 
a difference in mentioning wrongdoing of Japan (X²= 10.84, p<0.01, df=1). Meanwhile, 
stories on Renren (54%) mentioned wrongdoings of other parties  more than on People’s 
Daily (15%), and there is a significant difference in the two websites (X²=10.93, p<.01, 
df=1). Therefore, hypothesis 7 is supported. 
Sources 
Hypothesis 8 predicted that Renren will cite fewer official sources per story than 
People’s Daily Online. In the Li Gang case, the descriptive statistics (Table 19) show that 
Renren cited sources 452 times: victims (1.00, 24.1%, that is x victims per story), lawyer 
(0.30, 7.1%), Li Gang  (0.29, 6.6%), witnesses (0.23, 5.3%), students (0.33,7.7%), police 
(0.17, 4%), university officials (0.18, 4.2%), government officials (0.10, 2.2%), scholars 
(0.14, 3.3%),  and others (1.52, 35.4%), while People’s Daily Online cited sources 250 
times: victims (3.10, 13.2%), lawyer (0.40, 4.4%), Li Gang (0.10, 12.8%), witnesses 
(0.09, 2.8%), students (0.12,4.0%), police (0.44, 14.4%), university officials (0.05, 1.6%), 
government officials (0.19, 6.0%), scholars (0.05, 6.0%), and others (1.21, 39.2%). 
Independent sample T-tests (t=2.02, p<.05, df=184) revealed that Renren cited 
significantly more victims (1.00, 24.1%) than People’s Daily Online (0.40, 13.2%).  In 
addition, police sources were cited more on People’s Daily Online (0.44, 14.4%) than on 
Renren (0.17, 4.0%; t=-2.86, p<.01, df=184). Students were cited more on Renren at .10 
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level. No significant differences were found on other sources between the two websites. 
However, it is worth noting that 30% stories on Renren and 19% stories on People’s 
Daily didn‘t cite any source. While this may be expected on a social networking site, it is 
surprising for a mainstream news medium abiding to attribution standards. In fact, an 
average post on Renren cited 4.3 sources on average, while People’s Daily only cited 3.1 
per story. 
In the Diaoyu Island case, the descriptive statistics (Table 20) show that Renren 
cited sources 319 times (2.79 times per story): China (0.82, 29.2%), Japan (0.61, 21.9%), 
scholars  (0.34, 12.2%), public (0.06, 2.2%), and other (0.96,34.5), while People’s Daily 
Online cited sources 580 times: China (0.97, 21.7%), Japan (0.68, 15.2%), scholars  (1.71, 
38.3%), public (0.01, 0.17%), and other (1.10,24.7%). Independent sample T-tests 
revealed that Renren cited significantly fewer scholars than People’s Daily Online (t=-
4.18, p<0.01, df=242). In addition, average citizens were cited more on Renren (0.06, 
2.2%) than on People’s Daily Online (0.01, 0.17%; t=-2.37, p<.05, df=242).  No 
significant differences were found on other sources between the two websites. Therefore, 
the hypothesis is not supported. However, it is worth noting that 30% stories on Renren 
and 2% stories on People’s Daily did not cite any source. 
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CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION 
Summary, Significance, and Justifications of Results 
The purpose of this study is to explore the framing differences between the largest 
Chinese SNS, Renren, and the online version of the leading party paper, People’s Daily 
Online. Two cases were selected to test the differences, the Li Gang incident as domestic 
news, and the Diaoyu Island dispute as international news. Besides testing the differences 
in framing used by publics and official media, the study also examined sourcing and the 
factors that affect the number of times a story on Renren is shared and read.  
Sharing and Reading on Renren 
The study found that stories with certain characteristics are shared and read more 
than others. Among the four types of stories analyzed, stories in the format of text had the 
lowest mean number of being shared and read, followed by multimedia, which is a mix of 
text with picture or video. The stories in the format of picture or video only were far more 
shared and read than the stories with any text involved. It can be inferred that, as Plato‘s 
fifth corollary states, images and pictures hit the heart and cloud the mind. As 
―veridicality and verisimilitude of those images are rarely doubted‖ (Perlmutter, 1998, 
p.4), the feelings a picture or image is said to incite are taken as distinct, uniform, and 
transcendental, that is to say, if people do have emotional response, the kind of emotional 
response is assumed to be the same regardless of the observer (Perlmutter, 1998). As such, 
these formats, especially images or videos with emotion-laden visual information, are 
more likely to generate strong and similar response from audiences, and thus become 
more popular and widely disseminate information on SNSs. Furthermore, watching 
videos and looking at pictures require less effort as reading a long text, and in the 
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meantime, videos and pictures are as effective in communicating the key information to 
the viewers. Furthermore, some texts focused on complex explanation of an event, which 
might lose readers because of the cognitive efforts required by the text to understand its 
meanings. 
Superficiality did not really make a difference in shares and reads. Whether the 
story is treated superficially, i.e. simply copying and pasting other people‘s content or 
importing from other websites, or in-depth, with well-thought ideas and self-created 
message, did not really have an effect on the times the story is shared and read. As a 
matter of fact, during the coding process, the most widely shared videos were found to be 
the ones from other popular video-sharing websites, such as youku.com, ku6.com, and 
56.com, and the videos were made by the netizens instead of official TV clips. In the 
future, such cases could be further coded as produced or written by professionals or 
netizens, and also specify the easiness to understand the message. In this way, it can be 
discerned whether Renren is profuse with content originated from netizens. 
Interestingly enough, on Renren, the use of emotion-laden words and visual 
information made a significant difference on people‘s behavior of sharing and reading. 
The stories using such words like ―merciless‖, ―heartless‖, ―rampant‖, ―bully‖,  and ―piss 
off‖ to express strong and intense feeling towards a certain party or parties are viewed  
and shared by the SNS users as a legitimate outpouring of their own feelings, and 
therefore, stories containing such words are shared and read more. Similarly, the ones 
with emotion stirring visual information, be it picture or video or multimedia, are far 
more shared and read by Renren users than the ones that do not contain such visual 
information.  
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Renren’s Tone Being More Critical 
Several cues from the results tend to point to one direction, that is Renren, as a 
social networking site, appeals more to emotion. For example, the use of emotion-laden 
words and visual images is related with more shares, and the tone Renren used is either 
very positive towards some party such as the victim in the Li Gang incident or very 
negative towards some party such as Li Gang in the Li Gang incident, Chinese and 
Japanese government in the Diaoyu Island dispute. It is understandable, since Renren can 
perform as a medium to transmit news (Deuze, 2003), and it can also function as a 
personal outlet to express netizens‘ own judgments, feelings, and other personal views. 
Therefore, compared with People’s Daily, which is a professional mainstream media 
outlet, Renren is more aggressive, critical and lacking in journalistic control. However, 
this lack of journalistic control and professional guidance enables Renren as a place free 
from self-censorship, which is profound in China‘s news agencies.  
It is worth mentioning the tone towards China. On Renren, the Chinese 
government was blamed because it took no real action during the dispute except 
criticizing the Japanese government every time in press conference. Naturally, it is not 
the case on People’s Daily, a party paper which is not supposed to contradict with the 
official stance on such big international issues. 
Censorship and Credibility 
The second hypothesis predicted differences in mentioning censorship between 
the two media outlets. In the Li Gang case, no difference was detected. The possible 
reason is that after the hit-and-run incident happened, the university itself was reported to 
have censored students, and the local government also tried to censor the journalists from 
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reporting the case. Therefore, most censorship, which happened in the local government 
and university, was reported in both outlets to truly reflect the development of the 
incident abiding to the journalistic ethical value of adhering to the truth. 
However, a significant difference in reporting censorship was found in the Diaoyu 
Island case, and most of the censorship mentioned referred to the government‘s 
censorship regarding the sensitive issue. In the Diaoyu Island case, in order to control the 
development of the recent Diaoyu Island dispute, the Chinese government censored the 
use of the word 钓鱼岛 (Diaoyu Island in English) and, for a while,  made it a sensitive 
word shortly after a drastic protest happened in Xi‘an province with many Made in Japan 
cars destroyed (China Daily, 2010). This again confirms that the government allows 
certain amount of online debates of nationalism, but not to the extent that it will create 
real action, or other violent and extremist activities. On Renren, people were more critical 
of the media‘s obvious efforts to cater to the party‘s ideologies and guidelines, and most 
censorship mentioned on Renren actually referred to this kind of censorship. However, 
being a leading party paper, People’s Daily is not likely to point out the media‘s 
censorship. So it makes sense that Renren mentioned more censorship regarding the 
Diaoyu Island dispute. 
This finding that People’s Daily did not discuss censorship in the Diaoyu Island 
case, in turn, reveals that People’s Daily online, as most national media outlets, is not 
critical of the government policies in international matters such as the Diaoyu Island 
issue, but tends to give a more comprehensive coverage of domestic issues.  
As to mentioning the credibility of the mainstream media, it was only found in the 
Li Gang case. After the hit-and-run incident, CCTV spared five minutes in the national 
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TV news program to Li Gang and his son to apologize to the victims, and this triggered a 
wide debate about media‘s credibility, objectivity and their roles as the mouthpiece of the 
government. Mostly, the mainstream media being questioned is represented by CCTV. In 
the Diaoyu Island dispute, none of the two outlets mentioned credibility of media. For 
Renren, the reason might be that the information from the media is congruent with most 
Renren users‘ knowledge, and they do not think the media are not credible in this case. 
Another reason might be that for international news, people do not have as many sources 
and direct contact as for the domestic ones, therefore, it is hard to find incongruent 
messages that contradict or refute the mainstream media‘s news. 
The fact that People’s Daily did question the credibility of media in the Li Gang 
case, but not in the Diaoyu Island‘s case, again, confirmed the corollary that People’s 
Daily presents a more comprehensive coverage of domestic issues compared with 
international news. 
Dominant Theme 
 In the Li Gang case, stories from both outlets largely adopted power play between 
the powerful official and powerless mass as the dominant theme. Interestingly, no 
differences were found between Renren and People’s Daily mentioning censorship; 
however, there is a difference between censorship as a dominant theme. While on Renren 
12% stories focused on censorship, People’s Daily only had 4% stories focused on 
censorship. It seems that Renren was more aversive and sensitive towards censorship, 
while People’s Daily tended to downplay censorship.  
 Not surprisingly, only a few stories from the two outlets presented the case as a 
hit-and-run incident, and the power play between the powerful official and powerless 
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mass overshadowed all other themes. Looking back on all hit-and-run incidents that 
generated huge uproar online, most of them were related with rich or powerful negligent 
drunk drivers with disregard and disrespect for human life, such as the Hu Jia case 
(Sohu.com, 2009) in 2009 in which a university student was killed by Hu Jia, a young 
man from an affluent family (富二代 in Chinese, rich second generation). Therefore, it 
makes sense to conclude that it is the aversion toward the rich and powerful peoples‘ 
malfeasance rather than the sole hit-and-run.  
In the Diaoyu Island dispute, most stories on both Renren and People’s Daily 
focused on the dispute, however, Renren more heavily focused on Diaoyu Dispute than 
People’s Daily.  People’s Daily had a wider topic range from each country‘s military 
strategies to protect Diaoyu Island and other countries‘ intervention about this issue, 
while Renren‘s range was narrower.  The results also showed that few stories (6%) on 
Renren focused on the historical controversies between China and Japan, especially in 
WWII, while no story on People’s Daily mentioned this topic. Instead, People’s Daily 
focused more on historical records and literature about Diaoyu Island to prove its identity. 
This is also consistent with the presumption that People’s Daily, as a party paper, 
provided academic research to prove its standing, however, on Renren, the platform was 
used as a place to express people‘s own feelings. 
Frames 
  In the Li Gang case, most stories from both Renren and People’s Daily indicated 
that Li Gang and his son should be responsible for the issue; however, more stories from 
People’s Daily specified the party who should be responsible compared with stories on 
Renren.   
55 
 
Most stories from both outlets did not point out who has the ability to alleviate the 
problem, but among those stories specifying the capable party, stories from Renren 
believed that Li Gang should have the ability to alleviate the problem, while People’s 
Daily criticized and blamed the government more than stories from Renren, which is 
surprising, but also makes sense because, unlike users on SNSs, People’s Daily treated 
the incident as a societal problem. 
Since the Li Gang incident evolved around a hit-and-run incident, most of the 
stories on both outlets went into personal life of people. However, Renren used more 
emotion laden words and visual information to generate feelings of outrage, empathy-
caring, sympathy or compassion. In such way, Renren appealed to human emotion more 
than People’s Daily did. 
 Conflict was roughly equally reported by the two outlets, and most stories on both 
outlets only cited one side involved in the conflict. Even so, Renren seemed to lean more 
to one side, and presented a more single-sided story compared with People’s Daily. Atton 
(2005) questioned that alternative media tend to overly represent a side, while neglect the 
opposite side. This might be the case here, but since the code sheet did not specify which 
party is represented, it is hard to infer that this is the case.  
 As to the morality frame, stories from People’s Daily mentioned the wrongdoings 
of Li Gang and his son more than stories from Renren, and Renren mentioned more 
wrongdoings of other parties than People’s Daily, such as School and government 
officials, witnesses, and students from Hebei University. One possibility is that a story 
from Renren, being shorter and not abiding to journalistic norms, tended to focus on 
fewer issues than People’s Daily in a story, lacked consistency, and did not refer to or 
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clearly mentioned prior developments.  As such, the stories from Renren read like a 
stream of consciousness. 
 In the Diaoyu Island case, most stories on Renren and People’s Daily indicated 
that Japan should be responsible for the issue, however, dramatically fewer stories on 
People’s Daily presented that China should be responsible for the issue compared with 
Renren. Again, this confirms the corollary that Renren is more critical of the government. 
When it comes to mentioning the ability to alleviate or solve the problem, more stories on 
Renren indicated that China has the ability to alleviate the problem than Japan. However, 
most stories (95.4%) from People’s Daily did not mention the party who has the ability to 
solve the issue. It is worth noting that most solutions from Renren stories are based on 
impulsive reactions and shallow knowledge and strong emotion rather than professional 
and scholarly analysis. This is the case for the solution part, and most of the solutions on 
Renren were presented in a very simple style. 
 Like in the Li Gang case, no difference was found between the two media outlets‘ 
use of personal stories. However, more stories from Renren used emotion-laden words 
and visual information to appeal to human emotion and arouse resonance among netizens.  
 As to the use of conflict frames, more stories on Renren (95%) focused on 
conflicts compared to People’s Daily (70%). Conflict is a news value that is bound to 
attract audiences‘ attention. People’s Daily is a conservative medium that shows the 
stance of the government, which did not really revolve around conflicts. In this case, they 
provided historical proofs, military strategies instead of pure conflict around Diaoyu 
Island. Interestingly, some stories on Renren were titled ―China was totally defeated in 
this dispute‖, and they cited some unknown scholars to analyze the whole situation, and 
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to give more insights into the strategies used by each country, and reached the conclusion 
that one side was winning while one side was losing the ground.  However, such 
viewpoints never appeared on People’s Daily.  
 Stories on Renren mentioned more wrongdoings of Japan and other parties than 
stories on People’s Daily. Among the wrongdoings of other parties, some of them were 
referring to wrongdoings of China in being soft throughout history.  
Sources 
Atton (2005) predicted that alternative media give ‗ordinary people‘ privileged 
media access by favoring counter-elite sources while mainstream media cite more elite 
sources. However, this hypothesis is only partially supported in both cases. In Li Gang‘s 
case, Renren cited more victims (at p<.05 level) and students (at p<.1 level) than 
People’s Daily, while People’s Daily cited more police sources. In the Diaoyu Island 
dispute, Renren cited more average citizens as sources and People’s Daily cited more 
scholars as sources. In sum, People’s Daily used more scholarly sources, but fewer 
ordinary people sources, while Renren used more ordinary people, especially the 
powerless victims as sources. Also, surprisingly, Renren cited more sources overall per 
post that People’s Daily, a trend not met in the international affairs case. Average citizens‘ 
proximity to sources directly involved in the Li Gang incident might explain this. 
 Generally, stories on Renren were more critical and more extreme in tone towards 
every side, and also appealed to emotional sphere of human perception. Several framing 
differences were found, and those differences were mostly caused by journalistic 
standards on People’s Daily, personal outpouring of ideas on Renren, self-censorship, 
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and other reasons. Furthermore, Renren openly and directly confronted the mainstream 
media‘s censorship and credibility. 
Limitations and Future Research 
Since the stories from Renren are convenient snowball samples instead of all the 
stories regarding the two cases, it may be that the frames captured in the study used are 
not exhaustive and comprehensive. However, without an official search engine that can 
search the shared articles on Renren, it is not possible to achieve a full sample. And close 
to 100 is a pretty solid sample size that one can draw general conclusions from.  
 Secondly, some stories were censored or deleted with only the title left, and the 
researcher of this study could not access and collect them after the fact. In addition, 
videos on Renren can not be downloaded, and some videos, which were selected into the 
sample at the very beginning, were no longer accessible when coding. Therefore, there 
are missing data due to censorship and probably some inadvertent removing or deleting 
by netizens who published them. 
Although the study used two cases to prevent the risk that a single incident would 
be too case specific to draw any generalization, the overall dearth of scholarly research 
on comparison of contents on SNSs and mainstream media still pose threat to the 
conclusions.  
During the selection of the sample, several popular authors whose posts were 
shared by lots of people were found, and they consistently paid attention to the 
development of an issue or several hot social problems. In the future, it would be 
interesting to interview these authors, and to gauge their understandings of SNSs and to 
look into the motivations for creating and sharing content on SNSs. 
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It is also significant to survey the SNSs users about their habits of getting news 
from SNSs, and the perceived credibility of the messages on SNSs. As detected in the 
study, several stories questioned mainstream media‘s credibility in the two cases, and the 
distrust of mainstream media may alter their way of getting news, and Web 2.0, or even 
Web 3.0, would fill the hole as information source. In the meantime, it is also crucial to 
test the credibility of information online. If no quality and trustworthy information can be 
retrieved online, new communication technologies would become propaganda tools of 
false messages. 
Furthermore, since many stories on Renren were aware of censorship, and tried to 
get around it, it is of interest to test the techniques used by netizens to get around 
censorship and to circulate politically sensitive information in the new information 
environment.  
Conclusion 
Overall, this study gives users of social media even in authoritarian regimes hope 
that they may find alternative voices to mainstream media. People on Renren posted 
politically sensitive information that was addressed differently by the mainstream media, 
and the posts were widely shared and read by Renren users. Although self-censorship 
may still exist, Renren users openly and overtly question censorship and credibility of the 
media while managing to dodge censorship attempts. Generally, stories posted on Renren 
are more critical towards the officials and government and more positive towards 
powerless victims. Furthermore, stories on Renren appeal to emotion by using emotion-
laden words and visual information, which tend to create strong and uniform emotions 
towards certain parties, such as Li Gang and his son in the Li Gang incident and result in 
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more times being shared and read. However, stories on Renren can consist of news items 
shared from other mainstream media, or videos from mainstream media and netizens, or 
personal opinions towards a news story, and the mix of news stories and personal views 
does not provide an objective snapshot of news and, overall, tends to shift to one-sided 
presentations of the story instead of presenting a comprehensive view.  
Furthermore, the results of this study also partially negate the idea that the 
mainstream media in China always report the positive side of an event and neglect the 
potential negative problems, especially the ones that put the government in a negative 
light. As a matter of fact, it depends on what kind of story the mainstream media are 
reporting: in domestic news reporting, they provide more critical coverage than in 
international news coverage, and more in-depth reports compared with the reports on 
SNSs; in international news reporting, mainstream media are strictly adhering to the 
government‘s stance.  These results indicate a need for further investigation of domestic 
and foreign news coverage in both traditional and alternative venues in 
authoritarian/transitional media systems like China‘s. 
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APPENDIX I 
Code book for the Li Gang incident 
Coding                     
The coding sheet starts with objective characteristics of articles: title of the 
publication, date of the publication, length of each article, followed by the general tone, 
frames and sources.  
 
General Information  
 
1. Coder Name: Simply write your first name  
2. Control Number: Record the story number written at the top of each printed 
article 
3. Date of publication: Identify the date the story was created or shared in the form 
of  mm/dd/yyyy, and usually the date appears below the title. If no date is 
identified, please enter 00/00/0000. 
4. Title of the article: Please write out the headline in its entirety. 
5. Source: Record the data pool the story is from, ―1‖ for Renren.com, ―2‖ for 
Peopledaily.com 
6. Type of the story: Identify the format the story adopts, ―1‖ for text, ―2‖ for picture, 
―3‖ for video, and ―4‖ for multimedia. Any mixture of text, picture, video and 
other format should be coded as multimedia. 
7. Times being shared: Record the times bein g shared until the story was collected, 
and the numbers can be found on the right edge below the whole story. This is 
only for posts from Renren.com, and code ―0‖ for articles from People’s Daily 
Online. 
8. Times being read: Record the times being read until the story was collected, and 
the numbers can be found on the right edge below the whole story. This is only 
for posts from Renren.com, and code ―0‖ for articles from People’s Daily Online. 
9. What is the dominant theme that you identify 
1) Official power play v.s. powerless mass 
2) Drunk drinking and hit and run 
3) Censorship resulted from powerful official or government 
4) Other  
10. Is the subject treated  
0) superficially  
1) in-depth  
If the article is cited from somewhere else, such as a mainstream media report, 
other people's article, it is considered as superficial; on the other hand, if the article is 
created by the author itself with meaningful and deep thinking, then it is considered as 
in-depth. 
General Tone 
 Question 11-14 
Tone refers to the attitude of the stories toward each side. The tone towards one 
side can be positive, negative and neutral. If the story does not mention a party in 
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question, then code ―N/A (Not Applicable)‖. A story demonstrates a positive tone toward 
one side if it expressed sympathy and indicates support for this side. A story shows a 
negative tone towards one side if it reveals critical tendency or assigns blame to this side. 
A story exhibits a neutral tone when its only plainly states the fact or when it shows no 
demonstrable attitude toward the side in question.  
 
Generic Frames  
Question 15-25 
Frames refer to the overarching frameworks journalists use to structure a story. 
The textual frames will be ascertained by analyzing the complete article asking two to 
five specific questions for each frame. The five generic frames and most of the 
measurements were adopted from Semetko and Valkenburg‘s (2000) study, but the 
original measurement of morality frame is not suitable for this situation, thus we 
developed two new questions. Each frame will be coded on a presence/absence basis per 
news article.  
 
 The responsibility frame focuses on party/individual who should be responsible for 
the issue, and is measured by questions ―15. Does the story suggest that some party is 
responsible for the issue?; 16. Does the story suggest that some party have the ability to 
alleviate the problem?; 17. Does the story suggest solution(s) to the problem/issue?‖ For 
question 15, if the story suggests that some party should be blamed or responsible for the 
issue discussed in the story, then coders should select the party; otherwise, code ―not 
suggested‖. If multiple parties are to be blamed or responsible for the issue, then coders 
should identify the main issue, and main actors who should be responsible. As to question 
16, if the story suggests that some party should do something to provide somewhat 
solutions or make things better, coders should select the party; otherwise, code ―not 
suggested‖. Again, if multiple parties show up, coders should identify the main issues and 
main actor. Lastly, if the story provides certain action or method to solve the problem, 
coders should code ―yes‖; otherwise, code ―no‖. 
 
 The human interest frame focuses on the individual story and is measured by items 
―18. Does the story go into the personal or private lives of the actors?; 19. Does the story 
employ adjectives or personal vignettes that generate feelings of outrage, empathy- 
caring, sympathy or compassion?; 20. Does the story contain visual information that 
might generate feelings of outrage, empathy caring, sympathy, or compassion?‖ If the 
story mentions a person or several people‘s name with action, then code ―yes‖ for 
question 18. If only name(s) mentioned to describe a phenomenon. For example, in this 
sentence: ―since the ‗My father is Li Gang‘ incident happened, the local government 
strongly censored media report‖, although the name Li Gang is mentioned, but it is only 
used as a noun symbolize the incident, coders should code ―no‖ based on this sentence. 
Question 19 means to test whether there are emotional laden words used in the story to 
give readers strong negative or positive feelings like sympathy, angry, extremely 
disgusting, sad, happy, etc. Similar to question 19, question 20 examines the visual 
information, which could generate feelings mentioned in question 19, either in pictures or 
videos or multimedia. 
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 The conflict frames emphasize the discrepancy between people or organizations, 
and is measured by questions ―21. Does the story reflect disagreement between 
parties/individuals-groups-countries ?; 22. Does the story refer to two sides or to more 
than two sides of the problem or issue?; 23. Does the story refer to winners and losers?‖ 
For question 21, the disagreement or conflict can be other issues generated by Li Gang 
incident, such as the conflict between media and the university involved. Question 22 is 
designed to examine whether the story cite information from both sides who are in 
conflict, or only stands for one side. 
 
The morality frame focuses on the culture and social norms. It is measured by 
questions: ―Does the story mention wrongdoings of Li Gang and his son?; Does the story 
mention wrongdoings of other party?‖ The wrongdoings can be inferred from keywords 
synonymous for ―blame, fault, mistake, negligence‖. 
 
Other 
26. Does the article mention censorship? 
0) No 
1) Yes 
27. If yes, where does the censorship happen? 
0) N/A (Not Applicable) 
1) University and local government 
2) Other 
 
The first question, question 27, in this category deals with censorship. If the story 
includes such words ―read this before it gets deleted‖, ―censor‖, and other related terms, 
code ―1‖, otherwise, code ―0‖. As to question 28, if the story doesn‘t mention censorship, 
then code ―0‖; if the story states that the government and university forbade such remarks, 
then code ―1‖; if the story states the media did not want to pick up the issue or some 
source for certain reasons, then code ―1‖; if the story doesn‘t present obvious group or 
organization which are censoring the issue, then code ―2‖. 
28. Does the article mention credibility of the media?  
0) No 
1) Yes 
29. If yes, does it question the credibility of the media? 
0) N/A (Not Applicable) 
1) No 
2) Yes 
 
The second theme in this category explores the credibility of the media in general. If 
the story mentioned the credibility of any media, code ―1‖; otherwise, code ―0‖. If the 
story doesn‘t mention credibility, code ―0‖; if the story persuaded people not to believe 
the media‘s reportage, then code ―1‖; if not, code ―2‖. 
Sources 
30. Number of sources cited in the news material  
____Victims and their families 
____Lawyer/lawyers of the victims 
64 
 
____Li Gang and Li Qiming 
____Spectators 
____Students of Hebei University 
____Police 
____Officials from Hebei University 
____Government officials 
____Scholars and experts 
____others 
 
Sources refer to persons, agencies or organizations cited in the story to provide 
background information, pertinent facts and data, and interpretation of events. Sources 
will be classified under the above-mentioned categories, and when the coder conduct the 
coding, just check the sources that are mentioned in the story. In a paragraph, if the 
source is continuously mentioned more than once, count only one time. For example, in a 
paragraph like this: Li Gang said: ―……‖. He continued: ―……‖, source Li Gang should 
be only counted once; otherwise, count as many as appeared. 
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APPENDIX II 
Coding sheet for the Li Gang incident 
General information 
1. Control ID: ________________ 
2. Coder Name:___________________ 
3. Date of publication:__ __/__ __/__ __ __ __ (mm/dd/yyyy) 
4. Title of the article: 
______________________________________________________________________ 
5. Source: story from____________ 
1) Renren.com  
2) Peopledaily.com 
6. Type of the story: 
1) Text 
2) Picture 
3) Video 
4) Multimedia 
7. Times being shared: _______ 
8. Times being read: _______ 
9. What is the dominant theme that you identify 
1) Official power play v.s. powerless mass 
2) Drunk driving and hit and run 
3) Censorship  
4) Other  
10.      Is the subject treated 
1) Superficially 
2) In-depth 
General Tone 
11.      What is the tone toward Li Gang and his son? 
0) N/A (Not Applicable) 
1) Positive 
2) Neutral 
3) Negative 
12.      What is the tone toward the victims? 
0) N/A (Not Applicable) 
1) Positive 
2) Neutral 
3) Negative 
13.      What is the tone toward government? 
0) N/A (Not Applicable) 
1) Positive 
2) Neutral 
3) Negative 
14.      What is the tone toward the University? 
0) N/A (Not Applicable) 
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1) Positive 
2) Neutral 
3) Negative 
Generic frames: 
Attribution of Responsibility  
15.      Does the story suggest that some party is responsible for the issue? 
0) Not suggested 
1) Li Gang and his son, Li Qiming 
2) Victims and their families 
3) Government officials  
4) Witnesses 
5) Netizens 
6) Students of Hebei University 
7) Police 
8) Officials from Hebei University 
9) Others 
16.      Does the story suggest that some party have the ability to alleviate the problem? 
0) Not suggested 
1) Li Gang and his son, Li Qiming 
2) Victims and their families 
3) Government officials 
4) Witnesses 
5) Netizens 
6) Students of Hebei University 
7) Police 
8) Officials from Hebei University 
9) Others 
17.      Does the story suggest solution(s) to the problem/issue? 
0)  No 
1)  Yes 
Human Interest frame  
18.     Does the story go into the personal or private lives of the actors?  
0) No 
1) Yes 
19. Does the story employ adjectives or personal vignettes that generate feelings of 
outrage, empathy-caring, sympathy or compassion? 
0)  No 
1)  Yes 
20. Does the story contain visual information that might generate feelings of outrage, 
empathy caring, sympathy, or compassion?  
0)  No 
1)  Yes 
Conflict frame  
21. Does the story reflect power struggle between government officials and the public? 
0)  No 
1)  Yes 
67 
 
22. Does the story refer to two sides or to more than two sides of the problem or issue?  
0)  No 
1)  Yes 
23. Does the story refer to winners and losers? 
0)  No 
1)  Yes 
Morality frame 
24. Does the story mention wrongdoings of Li Gang and his son? 
0)  No 
1)  Yes 
25. Does the story mention wrongdoings of other party?  
0)  No 
1)  Yes 
Other 
26. Does the story mention censorship? 
0)  No 
1)  Yes 
27. Where does the censorship happen? 
0) N/A (Not Applicable) 
1) University and local government 
2) Other 
28. Does the story mention credibility of the mainstream media?  
0)  No 
1)  Yes 
29. Does it question the media‘s credibility? 
0) No 
1) Yes 
2) N/A (Not Applicable) 
Sources:  
30. Number of sources cited in the news material 
____Victims and their families 
____Lawyer/lawyers of the victims 
____Li Gang and Li Qiming 
____Witnesses 
____Students of Hebei University 
____Police 
____Officials from Hebei University 
____Government officials 
____Scholars and experts 
____Others 
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APPENDIX III 
Codebook for the Diaoyu Island dispute 
Coding  
The coding sheet starts with objective characteristics of articles: title of the 
publication, date of the publication, length of each article, followed by the general tone, 
frames and sources.  
 
General Information  
1. Coder Name: Simply write your last name 
2. Control Number: Record the story number written at the top of each printed 
article 
3. Date of publication: Identify the date the story was created or shared in the form 
of  mm/dd/yyyy, and usually the date appears below the title. If no date is 
identified, please enter 00/00/0000. 
4. Title of the article: Please write out the headline in its entirety. 
5. Source: Record the data pool the story is from, ―1‖ for Renren.com, ―2‖ for 
Peopledaily.com 
6. Type of the story: Identify the format the story adopts, ―1‖ for text, ―2‖ for picture, 
―3‖ for video, and ―4‖ for multimedia. 
7. Times being shared: Record the times being shared until the story was collected, 
and the  numbers can be found on the right edge below the whole story. This is 
only for posts from Renren.com, and code ―N/A‖ for articles from People’s Daily 
Online . 
8. Times being read: Record the times being read until the story was collected, and 
the numbers can be found on the right edge below the whole story. This is only 
for posts from Renren.com, and code ―N/A‖ for articles from People’s Daily 
Online. 
9. What is the dominant theme that you identify, rank them according to the 
importance of each theme: 
1) Territory dispute of Diaoyu Island 
2) Historical controversies and hatred towards Japanese, Japanese government 
and Japan 
3)  Historical record and literature about Diaoyu Island 
4) Other  
Main themes of the story are identified. To measure importance, the coder should 
combine the headline and the number of words together to make a judgment. 
9. Is the subject treated  
1) superficially  
2) in-depth  
If the article is cited from somewhere else, such as a mainstream media report, 
other people's article, it is considered as superficial; on the other hand, if the 
article is created by the author itself with meaningful and deep thinking, then it is 
considered as in-depth. 
General Tone 
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Question 11-14 
Tone  refers to the attitude of the stories toward each side. The tone towards one 
side can be positive, negative and neutral. A story demonstrates a positive tone toward 
one side if it expressed sympathy and indicates support for this side. A story shows a 
negative tone towards one side if it reveals critical tendency or assigns blame to this side. 
A story exhibits a neutral tone when its only plainly states the fact or when it shows no 
demonstrable attitude toward either side.  
Generic Frames 
 Question 15-25 
Frames refer to the overarching frameworks journalists use to structure a story. 
The textual frames will be ascertained by analyzing the complete article asking two to 
five specific questions for each frame. The five generic frames and most of the 
measurements were adopted from Semetko and Valkenburg‘s (2000) study, but the 
original measurement of morality frame is not suitable for this situation, thus we 
developed two new questions. Each frame will be coded on a presence/absence basis per 
news article.  
 
 The responsibility frame focuses on party/individual who should be responsible for 
the issue, and is measured by questions ―15. Does the story suggest that some party is 
responsible for the issue?; 16. Does the story suggest that some party have the ability to 
alleviate the problem?; 17. Does the story suggest solution(s) to the problem/issue?‖ For 
question 15, if the story suggests that some party should be blamed or responsible for the 
issue discussed in the story, then coders should select the party; otherwise, code ―not 
suggested‖. If multiple parties are to be blamed or responsible for the issue, then coders 
should identify the main issue, and main actors who should be responsible. As to question 
16, if the story suggests that some party should do something to provide somewhat 
solutions or make things better, coders should select the party; otherwise, code ―not 
suggested‖. Again, if multiple parties show up, coders should identify the main issues and 
main actor. Lastly, if the story provides certain action or method to solve the problem, 
coders should code ―yes‖; otherwise, code ―no‖. 
 
 The human interest frame focuses on the individual story and is measured by items 
―18. Does the story go into the personal or private lives of the actors?; 19. Does the story 
employ adjectives or personal vignettes that generate feelings of outrage, empathy-caring, 
sympathy or compassion?; 20. Does the story contain visual information that might 
generate feelings of outrage, empathy caring, sympathy, or compassion?‖ If the story 
mentions a person or several people‘s name with action, then code ―yes‖ for question 18. 
If only name(s) mentioned to describe a phenomenon. For example, in this sentence: 
―since the ‗My father is Li Gang‘ incident happened, the local government strongly 
censored media report‖, although the name Li Gang is mentioned, but it is only used as a 
noun symbolize the incident, coders should code ―no‖ based on this sentence. Question 
19 means to test whether there are emotional laden words used in the story to give readers 
strong negative or positive feelings like sympathy, angry, extremely disgusting, sad, 
happy, etc. Similar to question 19, question 20 examines the visual information, which 
could generate feelings mentioned in question 19, either in pictures or videos or 
multimedia. 
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 The conflict frames emphasize the discrepancy between people or organizations, 
and is measured by questions ―21. Does the story reflect disagreement between 
parties/individuals-groups-countries?; Does the story reflect the attitude of both 
governments after the incident happened?; Does the story include criticism towards one 
party or another?; 22. Does the story refer to two sides or to more than two sides of the 
problem or issue?; 23. Does the story refer to winners and losers?‖ For question 21, the 
conflict is not confined as the Diaoyu Island dispute in 2010, rather including issues 
rekindled, or generated by the incident. Question 22 is designed to examine whether the 
story cite information from both sides who are in conflict, or only stands for one side. 
 
The morality frame focuses on the culture and social norms. It is measured by 
questions: ―24. Does the story mention wrongdoings of Japan?; 25. Does the story 
mention wrongdoings of other party?‖ The wrongdoings can be inferred from keywords 
synonymous for ―blame, fault, mistake, negligence‖. 
 
Other 
26. Does the article mention censorship? 
2) No 
3) Yes 
27. Where does the censorship happen? 
0) N/A (Not Applicable) 
1) University and local government 
2) Other 
 
The first question, question 27, in this category deals with censorship. If the story 
includes such words ―read this before it gets deleted‖, ―censor‖, and other related terms, 
code ―1‖, otherwise, code ―0‖. As to question 28, if the story doesn‘t mention censorship, 
then code ―0‖; if the story states that the government and university forbade such remarks, 
then code ―1‖; if the story states the media did not want to pick up the issue or some 
source for certain reasons, then code ―1‖; if the story doesn‘t present obvious group or 
organization which are censoring the issue, then code ―2‖. 
28. Does the article mention credibility of the media?  
0) No 
1) Yes 
29. Does it question the credibility of the media? 
0) N/A (Not Applicable) 
1) No 
2) Yes 
 
The second theme in this category explores the credibility of the media in general. If 
the story mentioned the credibility of any media, code ―1‖; otherwise, code ―0‖. If the 
story doesn‘t mention credibility, code ―0‖; if the story persuaded people not to believe 
the media‘s reportage, then code ―1‖; if not, code ―2‖. 
Sources 
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30. Number of sources cited in the news material 
____Ministry of foreign affairs of People‘s Republic of China (PRC) and Chinese 
____Government in general 
____Ministry of foreign affairs  of Japan and Japanese Government in general 
____Scholars and experts 
____Public 
____Others 
        Sources refer to persons, agencies or organizations cited in the story to provide 
background information, pertinent facts and data, and interpretation of events. Sources 
will be classified under the following categories, and when the coder conduct the coding, 
just fill in the number of the sources that are mentioned in the story. In a paragraph, if the 
source is continuously mentioned more than once, count only one time. 
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APPENDIX IV 
Coding sheet for the Diaoyu Island dispute 
General information 
1. Control ID: ________________ 
2. Coder Name:___________________ 
3. Date of publication:__ __/__ __/__ __ __ __ (mm/dd/yyyy) 
4. Title of the article: 
______________________________________________________________________ 
5. Source: news from____________ 
1) Renren.com  
2) Peopledaily.com 
6. Type of the story: 
1) Text 
2) Picture 
3) Video 
4) Multimedia 
7. Times being shared: _______ 
8. Times being read: _______ 
9. What is the dominant theme that you identify: 
1) Territory dispute of Diaoyu Island 
2) Historical controversies and hatred towards Japanese, Japanese government 
and Japan 
3) Historical record and literature about Diaoyu Island 
4) Other  
10. Is the subject treated  
1) Superficially  
2) In-depth 
General Tone 
11. Tone towards Japanese government, Japanese, and Japan 
0) N/A (Not Applicable) 
1) Positive 
2) Neutral 
3) Negative 
12. Tone towards Japanese police 
0) N/A (Not Applicable) 
1) Positive 
2) Neutral 
3) Negative 
13. Tone towards Chinese government 
0) N/A (Not Applicable) 
1) Positive 
2) Neutral 
3) Negative 
14. Tone towards Chinese captain 
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0) N/A (Not Applicable) 
1) Positive 
2) Neutral 
3) Negative 
Generic frames: 
Attribution of Responsibility  
15. Does the story suggest that some party is responsible for the issue? 
0) Not suggested 
1) Japanese government 
2) Chinese government 
3) Other 
16. Does the story suggest that some party have the ability to alleviate the problem? 
0) N/A (Not Applicable) 
1) Japanese government 
2) Chinese government 
3) Other 
17. Does the story suggest solution(s) to the problem/issue? 
0) No 
1) Yes 
Human Interest frame  
18. Does the story go into the personal or private lives of the actors?  
0)  No 
1) Yes 
19. Does the story employ adjectives or personal vignettes that generate feelings of 
outrage, empathy-caring, sympathy or compassion? 
0)  No 
1) Yes 
20. Does the story contain visual information that might generate feelings of outrage, 
empathy caring, sympathy, or compassion?  
0)  No 
1) Yes 
Conflict frame  
21. Does the story reflect the territorial disputes over Diaoyu Island between China and 
Japan? 
0)  No 
1) Yes 
22. Does the story refer to two sides or to more than two sides of the problem or issue?  
0)  No 
1) Yes 
23. Does the story refer to winners and losers?  
0)  No 
1) Yes 
Morality frame 
24. Does the story mention wrongdoings of Japan?  
0)  No 
1) Yes 
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25. Does the story mention wrongdoings of other party? 
0)  No 
1) Yes 
Other 
26. Does the story mention censorship? 
0)  No 
1) Yes 
27. If yes, where does the censorship happen? 
0) N/A (Not Applicable) 
1) Government 
2) Other 
28. Does the story mention credibility of the mainstream media? 
0)  No 
1) Yes 
29.   If yes, does it question the media‘s credibility? 
0) No 
1) Yes 
2) N/A (Not Applicable) 
Sources:  
30. Number of sources cited in the news material 
_____Ministry of foreign affairs of People‘s Republic of China (PRC) and Chinese 
 government in general 
_____Ministry of foreign affairs of Japan and Japanese Government in general 
_____Scholars and experts 
_____Public 
_____Others 
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TABLES 
Table 1: Intercoder reliability of Li Gang incident 
Variable  Intercoder Reliability 
(Cohen‘s Kappa) 
Degree of Similarity 
Control ID  100% 
Date of Publication  100% 
Title  100% 
Source of the Story  100% 
Time Shared  100% 
Time Read  100% 
Theme 1.00  
Treated 1.00  
Tone Li Gang 1.00  
Tone Victim 1.00  
Responsibility 0.928  
Ability  100% 
Solution 1.00  
Personal Life 1.00  
Adjective  1.00  
Visual 0.857  
Conflict  0.828  
Two Side 1.00  
Winner  100% 
Wrongdoing Li Gang 0.894  
Wrongdoing Others 1.00  
Censor 1.00  
Where Censor  100% 
Credibility 1.00  
Question Credibility  100% 
Sources Intercoder Reliability 
(Pearson Correlation) 
 
Victim 1.00**  
Li Gang 1.00**  
Witness 1.00**  
Student 0.925  
Police 1.00**  
University 1.00**  
Government  100% 
Others 1.00**  
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
Since some variable‘s Kappa or Pearson Correlation value cannot be computed, they are 
measured instead by the degree of similarity. 
 
 
 
90 
 
 
Table 2: Intercoder reliability of the Diaoyu Island dispute 
Variable  Intercoder Reliability 
(Cohen‘s Kappa) 
Degree of Similarity 
Control ID  100% 
Date of Publication  100% 
Title  100% 
Source of the Story  100% 
Time Shared  100% 
Time Read  100% 
Theme 0.924  
treated 1.00  
Tone Japan 1.00  
Tone China 1.00  
Responsibility  100% 
Ability  100% 
Solution 1.00  
Personal Life 1.00  
Adjective 1.00  
Visual  100% 
Conflict  100% 
Two Side 1.00  
Winner 0.777  
Wrongdoing Li Gang 0.901  
Wrongdoing Others 0.862  
Censor  100% 
Where Censor  100% 
Credibility  100% 
Question Credibility  100% 
Sources Intercoder Reliability 
(Pearson Correlation) 
 
China 0.803**  
Japan  1.00**  
Scholar  0.852**  
Public 1.00**  
Others 0.989**  
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
Since some variable‘s Kappa or Pearson Correlation value cannot be computed, they are 
measured instead by the degree of similarity. 
 
Table 3. One-way ANOVA. Differences in sharing and reading story type 
Dependent/ Factor Text Picture Video Multimedia DF  F 
Share 2236 18279 12403 2595 3 7.42** 
Read 6580 259812 103036 6373 3 20.93** 
N=219 
ANOVA significant at **p<.01 level. 
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Table 4. One-way ANOVA. Difference in sharing and reading by superficiality 
Dependent/ Factor Superficially In-depth DF  F 
Share 4931 6970 1 0.475 
Read 36767 35246 1 0.005 
N=219 
ANOVA significant at **p<.01 level. 
Table 5. Independent-samples T-tests. Differences in sharing and reading by 
emotive words and visual information 
Test/Group Adj No Adj T Visual No Visual T 
Share 9957 1277 -2.34** 8925 4061 -1.98** 
Read 65570 5626 -2.34** 72470 25066 -2.68** 
N=219 
T-tests significant at *p<.05, **p<.01 levels. 
Table 6. Independent-samples T-tests. Differences in tone  
Variables/Sources Renren People’s Daily T-test DF 
ToneLG 2.58 2.47 1.43 184 
ToneVC 1.71 1.83 -1.58** 184 
N 105 81   
ToneJP 2.68 2.44 3.81** 242 
ToneCN 2.10 1.98 2.26** 242 
N 114 130   
Tone was coded: 1) =Positive, 2) =Neutral, 3) =Negative. 
T-tests significant at *p<.05, **p<.01 levels. 
Table 7: Differences in censorship mentioned by website and case  
Case/Sources Renren People’s Daily  Chi-square 
Li Gang  41 35 0.71 
N 105 81  
Diaoyu  21 0 24.84* 
N 114 130  
Chi-square significant at *p<.05, **p<.01 levels. 
Table 8: Descriptive analysis of the exact censorship mentioned on Renren 
Case/From University 
and local 
government 
Not 
Specified 
Case/From Media and 
government 
Not Specified 
Li Gang  77% 23% Diaoyu 10% 90% 
N 105   114  
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Table 9: Differences in credibility mentioned by website and case  
Sources /Case Renren People’s Daily Chi-Square 
Li Gang 13 9 0.52 
N 105 81  
Diaoyu 0 0 N/A 
N 114 130  
Chi-square significant at *p<.05, **p<.01 levels. 
Table 10. Differences in themes between Renren and People’s Daily  
Case Theme Renren People’s Daily Chi-square 
Li Gang All themes 100 100 6.97* 
 Power play 55 56 0.00 
 Hit-and-run 1 5 2.77 
 Censorship 12 4 4.37* 
 Other 31 36 0.83 
N  105 81  
Diaoyu All themes 100 100 27.53** 
 Dispute 75 57 9.95** 
 Historical issues 6 0 8.22** 
 Record  0 10 12.04** 
 Other 18 33 8.49* 
N  144 130  
Chi-square significant at *p<.05, **p<.01 levels. 
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Table 11. Differences in responsibility frames in the Li Gang incident  
  Renren People’s Daily Chi-square 
Responsible    12.59* 
 N/A 48% 28%  
 Li Gang 44% 65%  
 Victims 0% 0%  
 Government 0% 1%  
 Witness 0% 0%  
 Netizens 0% 0%  
 Students 0% 1%  
 University 0% 0%  
 Police 3% 1%  
 Others 6% 3%  
Ability to solve    11.64* 
 N/A 82% 85%  
 Li Gang 7% 5%  
 Victims 0% 0%  
 Government 0% 6%  
 Witness 0% 0%  
 Netizens 0% 0%  
 Students 0% 1%  
 University 0% 0%  
 Police 3% 1%  
 Others 6% 3%  
Solution    0.07 
 No 84% 85%  
 Yes 16% 15%  
N  105 81  
Chi-square significant at *p<.05, **p<.01 levels. 
Table 12. Differences in human interest frames in the Li Gang incident  
  Renren People’s Daily Chi-square 
Personal    1.80 
 No 9% 4%  
 Yes 91% 96%  
Adjective    9.71** 
 No 30% 53%  
 Yes 70% 47%  
Visual    22.10** 
 No 65% 94%  
 Yes 35% 6%  
N  105 81  
Chi-square significant at *p<.05, **p<.01 levels. 
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Table 13. Differences in conflict frames in the Li Gang incident  
  Renren People’s Daily Chi-square 
Conflict     0.02 
 No 14% 14%  
 Yes 86% 86%  
Two side    3.41 
 No 94% 86%  
 Yes 6% 14%  
Winner    1.29 
 No 98% 99%  
 Yes 2% 1%  
N  105 81  
Chi-square significant at *p<.05, **p<.01 levels. 
Table 14. Differences in morality frames in the Li Gang incident  
  Renren People’s Daily  Chi-square 
Li Gang    16.38** 
 No 39% 12%  
 Yes 61% 88%  
Others    4.70* 
 No 46% 62%  
 Yes 54% 38%  
N  105 81  
Chi-square significant at *p<.05, **p<.01 levels. 
Table 15. Differences in responsibility frames in the Diaoyu Island dispute 
 Who should be 
responsible 
Renren People’s Daily Chi-square 
Responsible    11.85** 
 N/A 33% 49%  
 Japan 56% 43%  
 China 6% 1%  
 Other 5% 7%  
Ability    45.06** 
 N/A 63% 95%  
 Japan 17% 3%  
 China 19% 0.0%  
 Other 1% 2%  
Solution    29.62** 
 No 61% 91%  
 Yes 39% 9%  
N  114 130  
Chi-square significant at *p<.05, **p<.01 levels. 
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Table 16. Differences in human interest frames in the Diaoyu Island dispute 
  Renren People’s Daily Chi-square 
Personal    1.26 
 No 11% 15%  
 Yes 89% 86%  
Adjective    34.08** 
 No 44% 80%  
 Yes 57% 20%  
Visual    19.53** 
 No 86%8 100%  
 Yes 14% 0%  
N  114 130  
Chi-square significant at *p<.05, **p<.01 levels. 
Table 17. Differences in conflict frames in the Diaoyu Island dispute 
  Renren People’s Daily  Chi-square 
Conflict     24.71** 
 No 5% 30%  
 Yes 95% 70%  
Two side    0.00 
  No 63% 63%  
 Yes 37% 37%  
Winner    5.82* 
 No 96% 100%  
 Yes 4% 0%  
N  114 130  
Chi-square significant at *p<.05, **p<.01 levels. 
Table 18. Differences in morality frames in the Diaoyu Island dispute 
  Renren People’s Daily Chi-square 
Japan    10.84** 
 No 31% 51%  
 Yes 69% 49%  
Others    10.93** 
 No 67% 85%  
 Yes 33% 15%  
N  114 130  
Chi-square significant at *p<.05, **p<.01 levels. 
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Table 19. Independent-samples T-tests. Differences in sourcing in the Li Gang case  
Case Sources T-test 
 Renren People’s Daily  
All source 4.30 3.10 1.63 
Victims  1.00 0.40 2.02* 
Laywer 0.30 0.10 1.60 
Li Gang 0.29 0.40 -0.75 
Witnesses 0.23 0.09  1.03 
Students 0.33 0.12 1.76 
Police 0.17 0.44 -2.86** 
U Officials 0.18 0.05 1.52 
G officials 0.10 0.19 -1.02 
Scholars 0.14 0.05 0.89 
Others 1.52 1.21 0.99 
 105 81  
T-tests significant at *p<.05, **p<.01 levels. 
Table 20. Independent-samples t-tests. Differences in sourcing in the Diaoyu case 
Case Sources    Mean Values T-test 
  Renren People’s Daily  
Diaoyu  Total number 
of sources 
2.79 4.46 -3.46** 
 China  0.82 0.97 -0.88 
 Japan 0.61 0.68 -0.43 
 Scholar 0.34 1.71 -4.18** 
 Public 0.06 0.01 2.37* 
 Other 0.96 1.10 -0.64 
N  114 130  
T-tests significant at *p<.05, **p<.01 levels. 
 
